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Abstract 
 
This thesis discusses the economic implications of Internet behavioral advertising, which targets 
ads to individuals based on extensive detailed data about the specific websites users have visited.  
Previous literature on behavioral advertising has focused almost exclusively on privacy issues; 
there has been less study of how it might affect industry structure.  This thesis examines which 
parties in the online advertising value chain would benefit the most from the demand for detailed 
behavioral data; in particular, it examines whether aggregators (such as advertising networks) 
that track behavior across a large number of websites would derive the greatest benefit.  
Qualitative stakeholder analysis is used to identify the strengths and weaknesses of several 
categories of actors: advertisers, advertising agencies, publishers, advertising networks, 
advertising exchanges, Internet service providers, and users.  Advertising agencies might attempt 
to bypass networks and work directly with publishers, becoming aggregators in their own right.  
Publishers might need to become interactive “information experiences” in order to collect 
valuable behavioral data.  Users might demand more transparency about what is happening with 
their data, or even more control over the data collection process.  Overall, agencies, networks, 
and advertising exchanges appear to be in the best position; publishers are faced with a harder 
task.  Furthermore, behavioral targeting may not result in a dramatic increase in overall online 
advertising spending.     
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Imagine that upon signing on the Internet, the ads one sees are a reflection of the websites he has 
visited and the products he has read about.  Every website one visits is factored into an engine 
which is also observing everybody else’s browsing patterns and the products they take an interest 
in.  The engine assumes that if Roger’s browsing patterns are similar to John’s, then maybe he 
will buy the same things as John – so why not show the same ads.  Because Roger looked at a 
review site for digital cameras, he starts seeing ads about digital cameras even when reading the 
news.  If he reads blogs about parenting, he’ll start to see ads for baby products.   
 
In short, the entire Internet would become a recommendation engine, similar to what is seen on 
Amazon.com and other online retailers: based on the products you have looked at, Amazon 
suggests others that you might find of interest1.  The difference is that while Amazon prefaces the 
recommendations with “people who viewed these products also looked at…”, the reasoning 
behind these ads will be invisible.  In addition, they will not purely be based on your past 
browsing, but also which advertisers are paying more.  And finally, the value chain for this 
recommendation engine is much more complex, as it incorporates a range of stakeholders: 
individual publishers, advertisers and intermediaries, such as ad networks. 
 
This is the future on which some in the digital marketing world are betting.  The technological 
architectures of online audience measurement enable sophisticated data mining and analysis of 
user browsing habits that increase the economic value of advertising to marketers and publishers 
precisely because users can be segmented into increasingly customized categories.  Drawing on 
the heritage of direct marketing, online marketers are attempting to make online advertising more 
finely targeted to individuals based on knowledge about what websites individuals have visited 
(Turow, 2006).  Looking at these expressions of interest, advertisers target car ads to those who 
appear to be shopping for cars, and show offers for discounted flights to those who have been 
shopping for flights.  At the same time, newspapers and other media outlets are seeing 
advertising revenues decline as people spend more time on the Internet.  Online advertising, 
though growing, is not yet as big a revenue source as print and radio and TV.  This is challenging 
media outlets to consider new business models or find ways to increase the value of their 
advertising inventory, potentially by making it more targeted (Downie Jr. & Schudson, 2009). 
 
This kind of targeting is based on collection of data by parties called aggregators, here defined 
as parties that collect data from a wide range of websites and/or users by virtue of their extensive 
business relationships with those websites’ publishers.  Advertising networks, including Google 
and Yahoo, are the most obvious aggregators, but it is also possible for other parties, such as 
advertising agencies, to play that role.  This thesis examines whether the new measurement 
architectures that are developing are likely to privilege large data aggregators relative to 
                                                 
1
 The connection between behavioral advertising and recommendation engines is noted by two Yahoo researchers in 
the materials for a Stanford course on “computational advertising” (Broder & Josifovski, 2009). 
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individual web publishers.  In the same way that credit bureaus, with their knowledge of 
individuals’ financial histories, have great power to determine individuals’ access to credit, 
perhaps these data stores will come to decide which ads people will see.  Furthermore, as 
marketing becomes more and more about data, a battle will develop over who has the data and 
who can use it.  Small publishers, unable to generate the volume of data needed for these 
tracking engines, might find themselves at a disadvantage.  The large advertising agencies might 
try to bypass the intermediaries they currently work with, in order to have more direct access to 
the data.  Users could themselves start claiming a stake in the “value” they produce with their 
online behavior.   
 
The question of market power is not new to this space; it was raised when Google acquired 
DoubleClick, one of the leading advertising networks.  At the time, Google was the leader in 
search advertising, whereas DoubleClick was a prominent player (but not dominant) in display 
advertising.  Neither party was competing in each other’s business directly at the time; Google 
did not do display ads, and DoubleClick did not do search ads.  The FTC evaluated several 
possible ways in which a merger might threaten competition, but in the end allowed the merger, 
ruling that the two markets in which the companies operated were separate enough (US Federal 
Trade Commission, 2007).  Notably, it did not consider the privacy implications of such a 
merger, holding that privacy was a separate concern to be evaluated by a separate department of 
the agency.  However, we now begin to wonder if such a benign interpretation can be sustained, 
and in fact the Department of Justice is believed to be considering antitrust action against 
Google2.  
 
Much of the focus on behavioral advertising has been on privacy issues, for good reason. 
Congressman Rick Boucher has introduced legislation to address privacy issues with online 
advertising, potentially limiting how data is collected or used.  Even if marketing is deemed to be 
an acceptable motive for collection of personal information, there remains that chance that such 
information might also be used for surveillance, policing or anti-terrorism purposes, if 
governments were to pressure private companies to share such information.  However, this thesis 
will not grapple directly with the privacy issues raised by behavioral tracking, which have been 
the subject of extensive discussion from a variety of points of view, including philosophy, law, 
sociology, and computer science.  The goal here, rather, is to better understand the economic 
consequences, and to suggest ways that policymakers might think about the economic 
implications of privacy regulations.  This is not to say that the privacy issues are unimportant, 
but simply that there are other dimensions to the topic3. 
 
This paper is informed by a reading of the trade press and discussions with several industry 
actors.  However, it makes no pretense of following an exhaustive, rigorous methodology. 
Economic reasoning and concepts will be used, but no formal economic model will be 
developed.  Limited quantitative data is presented, but this data is not sufficient for a quantitative 
study.  In some ways, the thesis takes the form of a stakeholder analysis, starting from an 
understanding of the goals of each of the actors in this system and the means they might pursue 
to achieve those goals.  That knowledge is then used to conduct a kind of “thought experiment” 
                                                 
2
 “Return of the Trustbusters” (August 27, 2009), The Economist 
3
 See also Baker (2008) for a discussion of how behavioral data mining technology might change other areas of life, 
such as politics and the workplace. 
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about what might happen if individual profiles were to be come highly valuable property in the 
marketing ecosystem.  This is not to say that other kinds of assets, such as technology, 
institutional relationships between advertisers and media channels, and the content of advertising 
messages, are not also important.  The purpose of this thesis is to start from an assumption, that 
data about individuals is economically important, and explore the implications of that 
assumption, in order to produce some testable hypotheses.  If certain kinds of behavior are 
observed in the market, there would be added reason to conclude that the assumption is correct.  
On the other hand, if the implications described in this thesis do not come true, then the initial 
assumption would be shown to be false.  This thesis engages in a kind of analysis that might be 
forced upon a policymaker with a need to produce some judgments but limited access to 
information about a fast-moving industry.  It is also influenced by earlier studies of how network 
architecture shapes the balance of power among the Internet’s stakeholders, and how those 
stakeholders can in turn attempt to restructure the network within limited parameters 
(Blumenthal & Clark, 2001; Zittrain, 2006).   
 
One important point sometimes lost in the discussion of behavioral advertising is that the 
observation of users’ behavior, and the targeting of ads based on that behavior, are two separate 
things.  Observation of users can occur even when no ads are displayed; and likewise, an ad can 
be displayed without recording user behavior.  The observer or collector of data need not be the 
same party that places the ad based on the data.  Thus there are actually two separate (but 
related) markets at work: the market for user data, and the market for online advertising.  Prices 
in the two markets may be connected, but in ways that are difficult to understand. 
 
In this thesis, the terms “advertiser” and “marketer” will be used somewhat interchangeably, 
although that is perhaps not correct in the strictest sense.  For some, “marketing” encompasses a 
broad spectrum of activities beyond simply advertising, such as market research, promotions, 
customer-relationship management and public relations.  However, for this thesis, the focus is 
specifically on advertising, which is defined as the purchase of space and/or time in a media 
channel for the purpose of displaying a message about one’s product.  Yet, the Internet enables 
and encourages individuals to actively choose how they engage with media content, and even 
allows them to avoid advertising altogether if they are savvy enough (by means of add-ons to 
Internet browsers).  The Internet also creates possibilities for new kinds of marketing activities, 
based not around the “broadcast” of a message or image to a huge number of people, but attuned 
more to the conversational nature of the medium.  Marketers no longer have total control over 
their brand messaging.  It used to be that an advertisement would be created and consumers 
would passively receive it via TV or radio, with no opportunity to talk back or respond.  Now, 
however, consumers can post reviews of products, and create and share their own videos about 
products on YouTube.  Spurgeon (2008) gives the following example: 
 
“Home videos of explosive Coke-Mentos soda fountains and Coke-Mentos rockets started 
appearing on the Web in early 2006. This association of Coke with a lesser brand of mints took 
both brands by surprise.  The brand companies could control neither the uses made of their 
products, nor the dissemination of the images of those uses.  The replication, video capture, and 
Web-based sharing of Coke-Mentos experiments snowballed...  Mentos was very happy with this 
popular appropriation and display of its brand, and its association with youth culture values.  It 
estimated this media exposure was worth US $10 million, equivalent to more than half its annual 
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advertising budget for the US market (Vranica and Terhune 2006), and took immediate steps to 
build on this publicity opportunity by partnering with YouTube to run a competition for the best 
Coke-Mentos video.  Although early responses from Coke were not enthusiastic, the global soft 
drink giant also elected to explore this consumer-generated media activity as a brand-building 
opportunity.  It mounted a 'Poetry in Motion' competition that challenged Coke consumers to 
show the world what extraordinary things they could do with everyday objects (Vranica and 
Terhune 2006).” (p. 1) 
 
It is possible that marketing will become as much about listening to what people are saying 
online about your brand, as it is about speaking to them en masse (Wetpaint & Altimeter Group, 
2009).  In addition,  marketers can attempt to focus their efforts on small groups of influential 
bloggers, and use them to spread the word about products.  This kind of activity has gained the 
attention of the FTC4.  Or, marketers can create small Facebook applications that people share 
with their friends.  Jenkins (2006) argues that marketers are increasingly looking to form more of 
an engagement with consumers.  Simply viewing an ad is no longer enough; marketers want 
consumers to express their identification with a brand by for example sharing personal stories 
about what the product means to them.  If that is true, there may be a demise of "traditional" 
online advertising models focused on pushing messages at consumers, in favor of models 
focused more on interaction and engagement.  However, this thesis will not examine that 
possibility in depth; the focus here is more on how traditional advertising practices have adapted 
to the Internet. 
  
The paper proceeds as follows.  Chapter 2 gives an overview of the Internet advertising 
ecosystem, describing the roles played and value offered by advertisers, publishers, advertising 
networks, and Internet service providers. Chapter 3 explores several important topics in more 
depth.  It explains how behavioral advertising differs from other kinds of ad targeting, gives 
some indication of the monetary value associated with behavioral advertising, and also briefly 
discusses online audience measurement, as another kind of data collection that can be compared 
with behavioral tracking.  Chapter 4 will explain the technology behind the tracking of users, the 
tools available to avoid such tracking, the kinds of “identities” attached to users, and the data 
available to various kinds of actors.  Finally, chapter 5 will return to our hypothesis and examine 
the ways in which market power might arise, and how various actors could challenge the 
concentration of data in the hands of aggregators.   
 
                                                 
4
 Stephanie Clifford, “Notice Those Ads on Blogs? Regulators Do, Too” (August 10, 2009), New York Times 
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Chapter 2. The Internet advertising ecosystem 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will briefly introduce some of the key players in the online advertising ecosystem, 
advertising agencies and publishers.  It will also discuss how various kinds of intermediaries, the 
advertising networks and advertising exchanges, have arisen to connect these two parties.  
 
Internet advertising is a market where websites sell space on their webpages to advertisers, who 
buy this space because they have a message to convey to the website's audience. Websites refer 
to this space on their pages as their inventory.  Online ads can be further subdivided into several 
categories: search ads, display/banner ads, video ads, and mobile ads (ads on mobile phones).  
This paper is focused largely on banner ads and video ads.  Banner ads were the first form of 
online advertising; a visual graphic appearing somewhere on the page, which when clicked, led 
to the advertiser's site.  Video advertising is a new, early-stage market, just developing now as the 
consumer appetite for online video has increased.  The advertising itself may be a video played 
before or after the content, or an overlay on the top, bottom or side of the video window. 
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Table 1.  US advertising and marketing spending, online and offline, 2008 (billions 
of $$)5 
Internet 23.4 
Search  10.5 
Display and rich media 6.5 
Classifieds  3.2 
Lead generation 1.7 
Video 0.7 
Email 0.4 
Sponsorships 0.4 
  
Offline advertising 
 
TV 57.9 
Newspapers 44.0 
Magazines 23.6 
Radio 19.2 
  
Other marketing services 
 
Sales promotion 76.4 
Telemarketing 47.0 
Direct mail 49.1 
Event sponsorship 21.2 
Directories 13.2 
 
 
 
As illustrated in the attached table, search ads are estimated to represent about a half of all online 
advertising spending; display and rich media (which includes interactive forms of visual ads) 
account for slightly less than search.  It is also worth noting that the combined amount spent on 
all forms of online advertising is still appreciably less than the amount spent on TV advertising, 
newspaper advertising and various kinds of “marketing services”, including direct mail. 
 
Lead generation, as defined by the Interactive Advertising Bureau, refers to “fees advertisers pay 
to Internet advertising companies that refer qualified purchase inquiries (e.g., auto dealers which 
pay a fee in exchange for receiving a qualified purchase inquiry online) or provide consumer 
information (demographic, contact, behavioral) where the consumer opts into being contacted by 
a marketer (email, postal, telephone, fax). These processes are priced on a performance basis 
(e.g., cost-per-action, -lead or -inquiry), and can include user applications (e.g., for a credit card), 
surveys, contests (e.g., sweepstakes) or registrations” (Interactive Advertising Bureau & 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009). 
 
Advertising is commonly divided into two types: branding and direct response. Brand 
advertisements have the goal of simply promoting awareness of their brand; they are not 
necessarily expected to elicit a purchase right away.  A brand advertisement may be based more 
around telling a story designed to raise interest or create desire in a large, mass audience.  Direct 
                                                 
5For Internet advertising: eMarketer, “US Online Advertising Spending, by Format, 2008-2013”, accessed August 
19, 2009.  For non-Internet advertising: eMarketer, “US Advertising and Marketing Spending, by, Media, 2008-
2011”, accessed November 22, 2009; original source is Zenith Optimedia. 
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response advertisements, on the other hand, have some immediate expectation of interaction or 
engagement with the user: for example, “Call this number to receive a discount”.  The distinction 
between branding and direct response is not hard and fast; a 30-second TV advertisement can tell 
a story but then invite the viewer to visit the company’s website for more information.  
Traditional brand advertising has been slow to migrate online; the majority of online advertising 
falls in the direct response category (Nielsen, 2009b). 
2.2 Advertisers and ad agencies 
Traditionally, all but the smallest advertisers have relied on advertising agencies to do much of 
the work of designing ad campaigns and buying ad space.  Agencies can offer a variety of 
services, ranging from creative development (producing the audio, video, or graphical elements 
of advertisements) to media buying (negotiating agreements to place ads with TV stations, 
newspapers, or other media outlets), media planning, public relations, and direct response 
marketing.  Agencies used to be relatively small organizations, but over the past few decades, 
there has been tremendous consolidation in the agency business, with the result that there are 
now a small number of holding companies which control almost all of the major agencies: WPP, 
Omnicom, Publicis, and IPG.   To some degree, these holding companies offer their clients (the 
advertisers) “one-stop shopping” for all of the different kinds of services listed above.  For 
example, the holding company Interpublic Group (IPG) owns the agencies Campbell-Ewald, Hill 
Holliday, McCann Erickson, Mullen, and Rogers & Cowan (just to name a few).  These 
individual agencies retain their own identity, despite their integration into the holding company6. 
 
It used to be that agencies would be paid on commission for media buys, i.e. they would take 
15% of the amount paid for a TV, radio, or other advertising spot (Cappo, 2003).  This 
compensation model incentivized the agencies towards big purchases of time and/or space in 
major media, and discourages small, incremental, experimental online campaigns where the cost 
of buying media (ad inventory) is relatively low.  In addition, agency clients (the advertisers) are 
pushing for more accountability from marketing spending, with measurements of performance 
and results.  Thus there is a trend towards a fee-for-service model, potentially time-based and 
with performance incentives7.  Measuring the performance of a direct response campaign is 
relatively straightforward: ad clicks, site registrations and online purchases can all be quantified.  
Measuring the performance of a brand campaign, on the other hand, is more difficult, and may 
involve brief surveys of people, or more complicated longer-term statistical analysis of 
consumption patterns. 
 
In addition to the pressure for measurement and continual refinement, in the online environment 
large agencies find themselves in an ambiguous relationship with technology companies like 
Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo. Agencies may be feeling some pressure from technology 
companies and advertising networks, as advertising becomes increasingly data-driven and 
quantitative: both the ad agencies as well as the technology companies are in the business of 
analyzing consumer behavior in order to predict ad effectiveness.  Potentially the technology 
                                                 
6
 The TV series Mad Men offers an interesting portrait of an agency in the early 1960s, before the rise of the holding 
companies. 
7
 “Clock-watchers no more”, (May 14, 2009), The Economist 
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companies like Google could try to “disintermediate” the agencies out of business. The ad 
agency holding company WPP devoted a small section of its 2008 annual report to the question 
of whether Google is a friend or a foe (WPP, 2009a).  WPP forecasted spending $850 million on 
Google search advertising in 2009, making it Google's largest agency customer.  Google and 
WPP also are joint sponsors of a three-year, $5 million research program on the effectiveness of 
online advertising, overseen by faculty from Harvard Business School and MIT/Sloan (WPP, 
2009b).  In its annual report, WPP reviewed the complex relationship it has with Google, and 
offered these comments: 
 
“All in all, Google is opening up the attack on many fronts.  Perhaps too many, particularly 
when you consider the other theatres it is fighting in, such as book publishing and robots to the 
moon. One gets the impression it is throwing a lot of mud against the wall to see if any sticks - 
maybe sticking to mobile search would be best. Yahoo! has a different approach, working 
through its agency partners and believing in the power of people, rather than Google's greater 
focus and belief in technology. Certainly, even now, a combination of Microsoft and Yahoo!  in 
any way will bring greater balance to the markets. Our clients and our agencies will favour a 
duopoly rather than a monopoly.” 
2.3 Publishers 
Publishers are individuals or companies that produce websites, and are dependent on advertising 
revenue. The terminology here is a bit awkward, because within the online advertising industry, 
it is customary to refer to any party that sells ad inventory as a “publisher”, even websites that 
are not authors or producers of their own content.  For example, an online retailer could be 
considered a “publisher” to the extent that it also makes revenue by selling ad inventory.  
Nonetheless, advertising revenue is more of a concern for the classic kind of publisher whose 
entire focus is the production of content and the sale of advertising inventory alongside the 
content, such as newspapers, magazines and blogs.  As  newspapers and magazines have 
migrated from entirely print media to mixed print and online forms, their ad revenue has 
decreased; spending on online advertising has not compensated for a decline in spending on 
traditional print and TV advertising (Downie Jr. & Schudson, 2009). 
  
In the online environment, as with other media, publishers’ challenge is to compete for 
consumers and to demonstrate that their audiences have value for advertisers. In essence, 
publishers are selling audiences. As different advertisers will be interested in different audiences, 
the challenge for publishers is to understand their audiences in such a way as to be able to sell 
their sites to advertisers. 
  
Publishers are also concerned about showing ads on their sites that alienate the users who are 
invested in the information, ideas, and imagination of the publisher. The key question for 
publishers is simply how to make the most advertising revenue from the site, without irritating 
users by overwhelming them with ads. The trade-off is between placing more ads on the page, 
which might increase revenue in the short term, but might push away or offend users in the 
longer term.  Some argue that publishers need to create a scarcity of advertising space by 
intentionally reducing the number of advertising spots on a page. 
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Publishers generally divide their inventory into two categories: “premium” and “remnant”.  
Premium inventory is the inventory that can be sold directly to advertisers at a high price; for 
example, the ad spots on the home page of a respected news site which may be seen by millions 
of people in the course of a day.  Remnant inventory is whatever inventory can not be sold 
directly to advertisers, perhaps because it is on obscure pages that are visited less often or do not 
have content with which advertisers prefer to be associated.  Of course, this distinction is fluid, 
and remnant inventory could become premium if packaged in the right way to advertisers 
(Winterberry Group, 2009). 
2.4 Advertising networks 
Popular, well-known websites and big-spending advertisers make deals directly with each other, 
but the remainder of the market works through intermediaries such as ad networks.  Ad networks 
have several functions in the advertising ecosystem: 
• enabling scale / reducing transaction costs by making it possible to advertise on a wide 
variety of sites without having to make deals directly with a great number of publishers 
• for publishers, screening for ads which may not be appropriate for the publisher’s site (for 
example, because they link to adult content or disreputable advertisers) 
• for advertisers, a kind of risk management: the advertiser may pay the network only when 
someone clicks on the ad, so impressions that yield no response do not lose money 
• collection and analysis of individuals’ browsing patterns and responses to different kinds 
of ad campaigns 
• related to the previous point, the ability to target ads to individuals based on their 
browsing habits or other variables (such as location and demographics) 
 
Advertising through an ad network works as follows: first, an advertiser defines an ad campaign, 
which is a set of parameters that describe where and when ads should appear.  For example, a 
campaign might specify that a particular ad should be displayed two million times on sports-
related websites for users coming from the West Coast during the second week of February.  
Based on these parameters, the ad network quotes a price for the campaign, generally based 
either on the number of ad displays (also referred to as impressions) or the number of clicks on 
the ad.  The ad network then is responsible for deciding which pages on which sites will show 
the ad.  It pays the publishers of those sites at a lower rate than the advertiser is paying, and 
pockets the difference as its own margin.   
 
The attached figure illustrates how money might flow between advertisers, networks and 
websites.  An advertiser might buy ad placements through several networks at the same time, and 
each of those networks may in turn place ads on several websites.  The advertiser at the bottom 
buys ad placements both through networks and directly from websites.  A website may receive 
payments and place ads from a number of networks, and also directly from advertisers.  In short, 
it is generally not a simple “one-to-one” relationship between buyer and seller, but rather a 
“many-to-many” relationship. 
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Figure 1.  Money flow between advertisers, agencies, advertising networks and 
websites 
 
 
(The arrows point from the buyer to the seller.  In other words, advertisers pay networks, which in turn pay 
websites.) 
 
 
 
Direct sales are generally more lucrative for publishers, and possibly more effective for 
advertisers, or at least more customizable.  They get more control over when, how and to whom 
the ads are shown.  On the other hand, ad networks are generally cheaper for advertisers, and 
provide a cost-effective way to reach a large audience quickly and easily.  For publishers, 
networks are a way to gain additional revenue from their ad inventory above what can be gained 
through direct sales, generally from remnant inventory that could not be sold directly.  Smaller 
publishers, lacking the name recognition to sell directly to big advertisers, may rely exclusively 
on networks for their revenue.   
 
A recent survey of advertisers8 reported that 90% of advertisers plan to work with ad networks in 
                                                 
8
 eMarketer, “Who Loves Ad Networks?” (May 18, 2009), 
http://totalaccess.emarketer.com.libproxy.mit.edu/Article.aspx?R=1007091, accessed July 20, 2009 
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2009.  But the majority of those advertisers spend 15% or less of their budget on networks. 
 
According to some estimates there are several hundred ad networks in existence today.  There is 
even a company Adify which develops the technological infrastructure for developing a network, 
which suggests that networks are becoming commoditized from a technological point of view.  
The market research firm comScore releases public rankings of ad networks based on their 
“reach” -- a measurement of the number of unique users that see ads from these networks.  This 
measure does not speak to the number of ads delivered by the networks, nor to the monetary 
value of those ads, but only to the size of the audience accessible to the networks.  The attached 
table shows this data for April 2008 and April 2009, illustrating how much the market changes in 
the course of one year.  The TV network Fox has a new Internet advertising network. Several 
other networks showed dramatic jumps from the previous year: 24/7 Real Media, Turn, CPX 
Interactive.  A number of other networks also showed some growth.  At a minimum, this data 
suggesets that Internet users may be seeing ads from a much greater variety of networks than 
before.  
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Table 2.  Top 25 US Ad Networks, by Reach (in April 2009), from comScore9 
Ad Network  Total Unique Visitors (thousands) 
   
 
   April 2008   April 2009    % change  
Total Internet Audience     190,728    192,875    1    
    
AOL Platform-A     170,508    176,455    3    
Yahoo! Network     160,206    167,129    4    
Google Ad Network     155,882    164,518    6    
ValueClick Networks     140,930    160,307    14    
Specific Media     144,773    158,012    9    
FOX Audience Network     N/A    149,249    N/A    
24/7 Real Media (WPP)   99,959    147,668    48    
Traffic Marketplace     114,682    143,519    25    
Microsoft Media Network US     119,595    139,674    17    
Tribal Fusion     135,113    138,274    2    
Casale Media - MediaNet     127,184    137,884    8    
interCLICK     107,961    134,834    25    
Turn, Inc     60,617    134,028    121    
Adconion Media Group     117,965    133,498    13    
CPX Interactive     69,178    130,370    88    
Collective Network by 
Collective Media   
  88,279    129,808    47    
ADSDAQ by ContextWeb     93,815    123,534    32    
AudienceScience (formerly 
Revenue Science)   
  N/A    121,001    N/A    
Burst Media     89,670    116,727    30    
Undertone Networks     72,940    97,053    33    
AdBrite     81,838    91,033    11    
Pulse 360     N/A    82,574    N/A    
Vibrant Media     72,351    80,779    12    
Adify     N/A    73,467    N/A    
Kontera     52,159    72,870    40    
 
 
 
This plethora of networks may be classified along several dimensions: the sites (publishers) that 
are part of the network, the level of transparency to advertisers, and whether or not they are 
owned by a larger media or technology company (Advertising Age, 2009; Karpinski, 2009a; 
Karpinski, 2009b). 
 
Sites targeted: Some networks work only with “premium” publishers that guarantee a “safe”, 
well-known, trusted environment for their advertisers.  Other networks focus more on the “mid-
tail” and “long tail” of sites.  The “long tail” is a term of art for the vast number of niche 
websites which individually have small audiences (perhaps in the thousands or at most hundreds 
of thousands of people).  Advertisers may view these sites as more “risky” in the sense that they 
know less about the content their ads will appear against, but those sites generally sell their 
                                                 
9
 Source: comScore press release, “comScore Releases April 2009 U.S. Ranking of Top 25 Ad Networks” (May 20, 
2009), http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2009/5/Top_25_US_Ad_Networks, 
accessed July 20, 2009 
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inventory at lower rates.  Also, there are so-called “vertical” networks focused on a specific 
industry or topic area, such as health care, politics, or sports.  For example, the MTV Tribes 
network is focused on the youth, music and entertainment vertical. 
 
The same site might sell ad space via a number of networks, but at a different price for each.  For 
example, a mid-tail political news site might sell ad space through an general ad network as well 
as a politics-specific vertical network, but the latter might pay a higher rate because it is 
presenting the site as part of a more valuable “bucket” of sites of similar kinds.  An advertiser 
interested in reaching a politically-savvy audience might be willing to pay more to a politics-
oriented network than to a general network (even if the latter network offers a “politics” 
channel). 
 
Transparency: This refers to the question of how networks balance advertisers' need to know 
something about where ads are being placed, with the network's need for control over this  
“proprietary” information.  If a network revealed every site on which an ad was displayed, the 
advertiser would know that it can place an ad on, say, the New York Times site much more 
cheaply through the network than through a direct deal with the publisher.  On the other hand, 
advertisers do want to know something about where their ads are displayed.  To address this 
need, the network might reveal categorical information: for example, the sites are in X and Y 
categories of sites, or they are in the top 1,000 web sites in terms of traffic. 
 
Even if the network does not share this data, advertisers and publishers may learn something 
about where ads are being shown from independent market research firms such as comScore and 
Nielsen.  However, as will be discussed later, this data also has limitations as it is usually derived 
from a sampling of Internet users. 
 
In some cases, advertisers are concerned about their ads showing up in objectionable places, such 
as adult sites, or competitors' sites.  Thus some networks allow advertisers to specify a 
“blacklist” of forbidden sites where an ad should not appear. 
 
Ownership: Some networks are started by brand-name publishers, as a way of increasing the 
volume of ads they can sell by incorporating other publishers into their orbit.  For example, MTV 
started an advertising network called Tribes which includes other sites that MTV feels are a good 
fit for its brand image.  NBC and Fox have also formed such networks.  In a sense, publisher-
affiliated networks are a kind of outsourced ad sales team.  On the other end of the spectrum are 
networks affiliated with ad agencies, which may be seen as ways for agencies to coordinate ad 
buys across all of their accounts, as well as to “cut out the middleman” -- i.e., the other networks.  
24/7 RealMedia is one example; initially it was a large, independent network, but was later 
acquired by the ad agency holding company WPP.  Then in the middle of this spectrum are 
“independent networks” which are not tightly affiliated with any single publisher brand.  
 
Other networks are owned by larger media or technology conglomerates, such as Time 
Warner/AOL, Yahoo, Google, or Microsoft.  AOL, for example, has recently made a big effort to 
enter the online advertising space, with a number of purchases of ad networks.  When a network 
is owned by a company with a content division (such as AOL), there may be an incentive to 
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privilege the in-house publishers over outside publishers and sites10. 
 
One investment banking report (DeSilva + Phillips, 2008) lists about 15 ad network acquistions 
in the year 2007 alone, as well as several more acquisitions in previous years.  AOL purchased 
several of these, and Microsoft, Yahoo and Google were responsible for a couple each.  WPP 
purchased 24/7 Real Media for about $650 million.  The largest acquisition was of the aQuantive 
(DrivePM) network by Microsoft, for about $6 billion.  Google's acquisition of DoubleClick was 
second, $3.1 billion.  The remaining acquisitions were on the order of tens or hundreds of 
millions of dollars. 
 
The variety of networks, acquisitions and ownership patterns suggests that there might be several 
different kinds of economies of scale at work in this market.  Vertical ad networks indicate that 
there might be an economy of scale in knowledge of user behavior and interests in particular 
topic areas (such as travel, sports or real estate).  The more broadly-focused networks suggest 
that there might be an economy of scale in knowledge of user behavior across multiple areas – in 
other words, there is value in developing a broad, multi-faceted portrait of the potential consumer 
from their behaviors across many kinds of sites.  For example, perhaps knowing about users’ 
financial activity might be helpful for marketing travel products.  If this were the case, then 
portals like AOL and Yahoo would also benefit, because of their variety of different kinds of 
content and places to interact with users.  Finally, there may be economies of scale simply with 
regards to the number of users reached by the network, and/or the number of advertisers buying 
from the network.  These different economies of scale would have different implications for the 
kinds of market power that might develop. 
 
One final point to note is that advertising networks are not really “networks” in the same sense as 
social networks like Facebook.  There is no concept of “friendship” in an ad network, and no 
complex “social graph” that one might wish to study or traverse.  It is interesting to contemplate 
if a new kind of ad network could be developed based on affinity relationships; for example, 
groups of advertisers could indicate their connectedness, and thus be targeted in similar ways, 
and likewise groups of publishers might indicate their relatedness and thus receive similar ads.  
Even individuals could express their preferences for particular brands or advertisers, and then 
receive offers from others in those advertisers’ affinity networks.  In some ways, this is already 
happening on Facebook, where individuals can indicate that they are “fans” of a particular brand 
or company. 
2.5 Ad exchanges 
As ad networks have proliferated, there has been some concern among publishers and advertisers 
both about the general transparency and efficiency of the market, given that multiple networks 
might place the same ad on the same site for different prices.  This has given rise to ad 
exchanges, platforms where networks, publishers and advertisers can buy and sell inventory in 
an auction framework.   ContextWeb's ADSDAQ, Yahoo's Right Media and APT, and Google’s 
DoubleClick exchange are the most prominent exchanges. Generally networks and agencies bid 
                                                 
10
 David Koretz, “Ad Networks Are For Idiots -- And Here's The Math To Prove It” (April 9, 2009), MediaPost, 
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?fa=Articles.showArticle&art_aid=103729 
25 
 
against each other for publisher inventory, but it is also possible for publishers to sell inventory 
to other publishers (who then resell it as part of a larger block), or networks to sell to other 
networks.  Thus there is a breakdown of the simple model where advertisers buy from networks, 
who in turn buy from publishers; now everybody is buying from everybody else. 
 
Yahoo runs two ad exchanges: Right Media and APT.  Right Media was acquired by Yahoo in 
2007, and claims to handle over 8 billion impressions per day, for premium as well as mid/long-
tail advertisers and publishers.  This is all auctioned in real-time -- there is no provision for 
reserving inventory ahead of time.   APT, on the other hand, appears to be Yahoo's vision of the 
next generation of exchanges.  It allows both real-time and “futures” trading, also known as 
“non-guaranteed” and “guaranteed” inventory.  “Guaranteed” inventory is bought ahead of time: 
the seller guarantees a fixed number of impressions or clicks during a specified time period.  
“Non-guaranteed” inventory, on the other hand, is auctioned in real-time based on price.  APT 
was just rolled out in late 2008, and currently is only offered to a consortium of newspaper 
publishers affiliated with Yahoo.  However, the company appears to be planning for APT to 
replace Right Media in the long term11. 
 
Interestingly, both Right Media and APT offer public application programming interfaces (APIs) 
which allow third-party software developers to develop applications that manage ad campaigns 
in the exchanges.  These third-party systems can create ad campaigns, set bid prices, offer 
publisher inventory, and access campaign performance data.  The APT interface even allows 
agencies and networks to manage multiple advertiser accounts within the system, as well as 
define approval workflows for ad creatives.  These APIs potentially allow third parties to develop 
innovative services to help advertisers, publishers and networks manage their business through 
the exchange, and not be limited to the user interface and tools provided by Yahoo. 
 
The exchanges reflect a standardization of some of the parameters and interfaces of advertising 
buying and selling.  As long as networks can comply with these standard interfaces, they are free 
to innovate in terms of how they buy inventory and package audiences.  Likewise, publishers 
must characterize their audiences according to standardized criteria, such as demographics (age, 
gender, household income), so that advertisers and networks can compare publishers to each 
other and decide  which offer the best inventory (the means for determining these demographics 
will be discussed further in the next chapter).  However, the exchange does not force advertisers 
and publishers to work with all of the networks in the market (or vice versa); each of the parties 
is still free to choose with whom it does business. 
 
There is another kind of player in the ecosystem, the yield optimizers, which in some ways are 
similar to ad exchanges, but are more specifically focused on serving publishers by ensuring that 
the networks that can pay the publisher the most are showing ads.  Like an exchange, the yield 
optimizer runs an auction for each impression in real-time to determine the highest price for the 
sale.  Two prominent yield optimizers are Rubicon and AdMeld.  AdMeld marketing material 
reports that it can increase publisher revenues from ad networks by 30 to 300%.  (Note that yield 
optimizers do not intervene in the direct sales process, so they do not increase yields from direct 
ad sales.)  The Huffington Post, a popular news website, reported an increase in ad network 
revenue by 200% from the AdMeld system.  Prior to using AdMeld, they had to negotiate with 
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 Yahoo, “APT from Yahoo! FAQs”, http://apt.yahoo.com/faqs.php, accessed Aug 3, 2009 
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individual networks on an ongoing basis to determine which networks would provide the most 
revenue for particular sections of the site (and perhaps for particular users as well). 
2.6 ISPs 
It is worth commenting about the role of Internet service providers (ISPs) in this ecosystem, as 
this is potentially a shift in the landscape.  ISPs have largely been absent from the online 
advertising ecosystem, although there have been cases where they replaced the ads on publisher 
sites with ads of their own choosing.  In addition, there have been attempts by ISPs to manage 
the placement of ads on websites, most recently with abortive partnerships with the company 
NebuAd to do behavioral targeting based on ISPs’ extensive visibility of online traffic (Ohm, 
2009).  ISPs soon cancelled these projects because of public criticism of them as an invasion of 
users’ privacy; there were Congressional hearings about the matter, and a class-action lawsuit 
against NebuAd.  However, it is worth considering whether ISPs may yet try to enter the online 
advertising space in some other way in the future. 
 
In the US, most ISPs were either traditionally cable operators or phone companies, but those 
boundaries have broken down as both types of companies offer a “triple play” of phone, TV and 
Internet service.  Consumers increasingly want to watch video online, which demands greater 
bandwidth from ISPs with challenges the traditional advertising monetization model of TV.   For 
example, NBC, News Corp. (Fox) and now Disney (ABC) have a joint venture Hulu to put TV 
shows online.  It is estimated that NBC gets only 10 cents in revenue from online video (from 
sites such as Hulu) for each dollar in broadcast (O'Leary, 2009).  Partly this is because agency 
media buyers are still trying to understand how to buy inventory on Hulu, where the standard 
Nielsen TV ratings do not exist, and advertisers have limited knowledge of which shows include 
their ads.  But Hulu may also be intentionally withholding inventory from the market to avoid 
cannibalizing their regular TV ad sales. 
 
Convergence also manifests itself in other ways, as NBC has separate deals with both Google 
and Microsoft to use online systems to sell some of its ad inventory12.  This comes after a failed 
attempt by eBay several years ago to build an auction marketplace for cable ad inventory. 
 
Canoe Ventures is an initiative between all of the major cable operators to standardize the 
technology for deploying targeted and interactive advertising, so that advertisers can launch 
campaigns on all of the cable systems via one process, rather than having to work with different 
systems for different operators.  It is not attempting to build a single marketplace (like an ad 
exchange) where ads are bought and sold, rather it is just defining the technical protocols by 
which advertisers, cable operators and networks can communicate.  Detailed technical 
specifications are available online for download13.  Initially, the hope was to deploy an initial 
version of a targeted advertising system this year, where a special version of an ad could be 
deployed to specific high-income cable zones -- but this ran into technical and business 
                                                 
12
 Chris Albrecht, “NBC Enters Into Targeted TV Ad Pact with Microsoft” (June 18, 2009), NewTeeVee, 
http://newteevee.com/2009/06/18/nbc-enters-into-targeted-tv-ad-pact-with-microsoft/, accessed August 17, 
2009 
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 http://www.advancedadvertising.tv/ 
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difficulties with existing cable infrastructure (Spangler, 2009).  In the near term, Canoe is 
focusing on an interactive TV product which will allow viewers to click a button on their remote 
controls in order to receive more information about a product.  
 
Time Warner and Comcast have also launched an initiative called “TV Anywhere”, currently in 
trial phase, which allows cable subscribers access to TV shows online14.  In other words, the 
channels a subscriber watches through cable TV, for example TNT and TBS, would also provide 
their shows online via a yet-to-be-revealed subscriber authentication mechanism.  Content would 
be accessible via any broadband connection, not just the connection in the subscriber's home.  
Thus he or she might access the content at a cafe or via a mobile phone after authenticating.  
Also, the content would be accessible from a number of sites, such as comcast.net, fancast.com, 
TNT.tv, and TBS.com; viewers would not be forced to go to a single source to access the content.  
 
There is another kind of player in this market, which is in some ways like the ISP, but in other 
ways different.  The content-delivery network Akamai is now also offering a CDN-based 
behavioral advertising product.  Akamai is not an ISP, but it is in some sense "inside the 
network" so it has some knowledge of people's browsing habits.  They also know some of the 
content that people are seeing because they serve the content.  On the other hand, like an ad 
network, the CDN can only identify users based on cookies, not their physical connection to the 
Internet (which will be discussed further in the technology chapter).  In addition, CDNs would 
not be covered by the privacy law that governs ISPs, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA). 
2.7 Other players: data exchanges and web analytics services 
Finally, it is worth noting a couple of other kinds of players in this system just as examples of 
how the value chain is evolving and differentiating.   
 
There are now “data exchanges” named BlueKai and eXelate which buy and sell information 
about individual users’ interests.  For example, a car-shopping website which observes that a 
particular user is looking at information about the Toyota Prius can sell that information to these 
exchanges, which in turn sells the data to marketers.  Thus, data exchanges represent a separation 
of the data about individuals from the ad targeting.   
 
There are also web analytics services which collect data about user activity on websites in order 
to help the website designers better understand their users.  Google Analytics, Omniture (recently 
acquired by Adobe), and Webtrends are three prominent third-party web analytics services.  
Publishers send these services records of their users’ click patterns: which pages each user visits 
and in what order.  The analytics services look for patterns in this data in a variety of ways, such 
as identifying the most common navigation paths through a website, and the places where users 
most frequently leave the site.  But, one can imagine this data also being used for marketing 
purposes. 
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 Chris Albrecht, “Comcast and Time Warner Talk TV Anywhere, But Don’t Say Much” (June 24, 2009), 
http://newteevee.com/2009/06/24/comcast-and-time-warner-talk-tv-everywhere-but-dont-say-much/, 
accessed August 17, 2009 
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2.8 Actors that play multiple roles: Google, Yahoo and AOL 
Finally, it is worth noting the existence of actors that have multiple roles in this ecosystem: most 
notably, Google, Yahoo and AOL. 
 
The Google search engine can be viewed as a publisher, in that it provides content to users and 
receives revenue from displaying ads against that content.  It is the dominant search engine in the 
US, and the leading seller of search advertising.  Google also operates two ad networks: Google 
AdSense and DoubleClick.  Google AdSense places text ads (the same ads seen on the search 
engine) on the pages of many other publishers.  DoubleClick is a display ad network also 
reaching many users and publishers.  Finally, Google recently announced the DoubleClick ad 
exchange for display ads. 
 
Yahoo, like Google, has a search engine (albeit with much less traffic than Google), ad network 
and an ad exchange.  It is also a portal, a particular type of publisher with a wide variety of other 
kinds of content and ways to engage users.  Finally, AOL has a portal and ad network, but not an 
exchange.   
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Chapter 3. Advertising measurement, behavioral 
targeting and ad pricing 
This chapter examines behavioral advertising in more detail, and also how online ads are priced.  
But first it looks at general audience measurement to illustrate the kinds of data available to 
marketers about websites, and the importance of independent third parties that provide credible 
numbers about viewership and usage.  In this respect, online advertising is following the path of 
TV and other media, with their Nielsen ratings.  However, the Internet presents unique 
measurement problems and opportunities.  It is conceivable that behavioral data analysis will 
become an alternative way to produce general audience measurements.   
3.1 Online general audience measurements / panel surveys 
General audience measurements are the baseline or summary measurements that give marketers 
an overview of the people who visit a given website, in order to plan their ad campaigns.  These 
may be seen as the Internet analogue of the Nielsen ratings that are fundamental to television 
advertising.  These figures include the number of unique visitors to a website, the length of time 
spent on the website, and the demographics of the visitors (age, gender and income level).  As 
with TV ratings, it is desirable for these figures to be produced by independent third parties not 
associated with particular publishers, because publishers have an incentive to report large 
numbers of viewers in order to attract greater ad revenue (Bermejo, 2007).  As will be discussed 
further in the technology chapter, the publisher does have some idea of the number of visitors to 
its site, but even its data has limitations.  Also, the publisher can not learn the demographics of 
those visitors without asking for demographic information as part of the registration process (and 
relying on the visitors to provide accurate information).  Thus the independent measurement 
companies can provide valuable information to publishers as well as advertisers. 
 
The measurement companies generally use survey panels, large numbers of people who have 
agreed to install software on their computers that records all of their browsing activity and shares 
it with the survey company.  These people also report their age, income and other demographics, 
so that the survey company can produce statistics about the comparative demographics of 
different sites.  Nielsen and comScore are the biggest names in online audience measurement, but 
there are other players, such as Quantcast, Compete and recently Google’s free Ad Planner tool.  
All of these companies can estimate, for example, the percentage of a given site’s visitors that are 
males between 18 and 25, or have an annual income above $100k.   
 
One difficulty with these kinds of survey-based measurements is that it is hard to produce data 
for sites with small audiences (also known as the problem of “audience fragmentation”).  
Suppose that it is necessary to have at least 100 people in the panel visit a site in order to produce 
statistics about that site.  In that case, a panel size of 200,000 could only measure sites with more 
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than 100,000 visitors15.  ComScore claims to have more than 2 million people worldwide in its 
panel16.  Nielsen has recently enlarged its US panel from 30,000 to over 225,000 people, 
allowing it to measure the audiences of 30,000 distinct sites17.   
 
Another issue with panel measurements is that it is difficult to collect data on browsing behavior 
in the office, because office IT departments may not allow the installation of the monitoring 
software.  Finally, there is the challenge of projecting and weighting survey results to account for 
the biases in the survey panel.  Given all of these issues, it is perhaps not a surprise that different 
companies can produce significantly different estimates for the same site’s audience.  For 
example, in March 2009, Nielsen and comScore reported dramatically different viewership 
numbers for the online video site Hulu: Nielsen reported that Hulu had 8.9 million viewers, 
whereas comScore reported 42 million18. 
 
On the following pages are screenshots of the audience statistics for the New York Times website 
from two different free analytics services: Google Ad Planner and Quantcast19.  In both cases, the 
data refers only to viewers coming from the U.S.  The trend graphs show an estimate of the 
unique number of visitors each day, over the past two years.  The two services show similar 
results, although Quantcast reports slightly higher numbers, especially recently (1.9 million daily 
visitors for Quantcast, compared with 0.7 million for Google).  Interestingly, the numbers are 
reversed when looking at unique visitors per month: Google shows 19 million, whereas 
Quantcast gives 14 million (not shown in the figures).  In terms of the demographics, Quantcast 
reports that men dominate the readership, whereas Google reports a fairly even gender 
distribution.  Quantcast also reports a slightly richer audience than Google (a higher percentage 
of households with income above $100,000).  It is hard to say which set of statistics is more 
“correct”, without knowing more about the two services’ methodologies. 
 
These panel surveys can also measure how many people see particular advertisements, thus 
providing a way for advertisers to double-check the numbers generated by their own systems.  
However, again, the survey data is only reliable for advertisements targeted at large audiences 
and on high-traffic sites.  Once advertisements are targeted to small numbers of individuals based 
on particular aspects of their browsing history, for example, these survey panels can no longer 
produce credible data.  In short, behavioral targeting makes third-party verification of advertising 
display much more difficult. 
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 This is a rough calculation, based on the fact that there are approximately 190 million Internet users in the US, and 
assuming that the site’s audience demographics are not skewed significantly relative to the population of all Internet 
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Figure 2.  Screenshot of Google Ad Planner audience data for "nytimes.com" 
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Figure 3.  Screenshot of Quantcast audience data for "nytimes.com" 
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3.2 Ad targeting 
The problem of matching advertisements with advertising spots is called ad targeting.  The 
advertising network and advertising exchange faces what is ultimately a decision problem: given 
a webpage, user, and a set of candidate advertisements, which advertisement will yield the most 
profit, subject to contractual guarantees and constraints (i.e. “this ad must be shown two million 
times in the next week”; “do not show this ad on sports websites”)?  The decision is generally 
based on some combination of a number of factors: the content on the webpage, the time of day 
or time of week, and whatever is known about the user, which might just be that the user is 
coming from California, or might be much more extensive (Broder & Josifovski, 2009).  A 
contextual ad targeting system is one in which the webpage content is the primary determinant of 
the ad that is displayed, whereas a behavioral system is one in which the past behavior of the 
user is more important than the content of the page.  In practice, systems often combine 
contextual and behavioral targeting, making use of whichever approach is suitable for each ad 
impression; if very little is known about the user, then a contextual approach may be necessary, 
but if the user is well-known, then a behavioral approach is possible.  For example, the Google 
AdSense ad network initially used purely contextual targeting, but now uses a combination of 
contextual and behavioral data. 
 
Contextual targeting refers to targeting of ads based on the context of the ad. The goal is to 
identify the sites that have the greatest "fit" with the ad in terms of their content. Webpages are 
analyzed to identify the topics represented on the page, and ads are selected which are relevant to 
those topics. Bamboo ads go on bamboo pages; fishing ads go on fishing pages.  This kind of 
targeting is still very common. 
 
Behavioral targeting refers to targeting focused on individual users and the interests indicated by 
their browsing activity.   The idea is to develop profiles of users based on their activities across a 
number of sites.  For example, the tracking system may observe that a person visited the “Toys” 
section of Amazon.com (an online retailer), looked at several different products, made a short 
detour to the “DVD” section, and then visited another website Toyforum.com where parents 
discuss toys and offer their opinions about which kinds of toys are better for kids.  A behavioral 
tracking system may also record the frequency with which users visit a site or particular sections 
of a site; some users may visit the site just once a year when shopping for Christmas gifts, 
whereas others may visit the site repeatedly as they consider making purchases throughout the 
year.  Based on all of this information, other websites may then present that person with an ad for 
a particular toy, even sites that do not have anything to do with toys or children.  Behavioral 
targeting can also take the simple form of displaying an ad about a product to a person who has 
already expressed interest in that specific product; this is referred to as “re-targeting”. 
 
Behavioral targeting may be viewed as an extension of database marketing and direct marketing 
techniques that developed in the 1970s and 1980s (Turow, 2006).  The increased availability of 
computer technologies for business led to the rise of a new kind of direct marketing, based on 
“segmenting” consumers into various categories in order to send customized messages to each 
group.  Databases of income levels, age, race, spending patterns, and lifestyle preferences for ZIP 
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codes or even individual households became available.  This data could be used to segment 
potential or existing consumers in a variety of ways.  Before the Internet, companies like Equifax 
and Claritas were already segmenting American households into a range of psychographic 
categories (such as “tree hugger” and “bible thumper”) that marketers used to craft customized 
messages.  Companies also built databases of individuals’ purchase activity and credit history.  
All of this data can in fact be used to target online advertisements, once the advertising network 
(or whoever is placing the ad) has access to a street address, account number or other connection 
to an offline identity (Winterberry Group, 2009). 
 
As noted earlier, behavioral advertising comprises two separate activities, which need not be 
done by the same company or at the same time: observation of users’ behavior, and targeting ads 
based on that behavior.  As the next chapter will describe in more detail, observation or tracking 
can occur without the display of an ad, and likewise ads can be displayed without behavior being 
tracked.  In addition, the company which is collecting data about users may not be the same 
company that is targeting ads with that data.  The existence of “data exchanges”, e.g. BlueKai 
and eXelate, which collect behavioral data from a number of publishers and resell that data to 
advertisers, demonstrates how these two activities can be separated.  These exchanges may be 
seen as the online analogues of the mailing list brokers for offline direct marketing.  In an 
industry conference20, some speculated that data about users could in fact have more value than 
ad inventory.   
 
The attached table is a list of the categories which are used to classify users in AOL's advertising 
system.  In marketing parlance, these categories are called “segments”.  A bit of terminology is 
perhaps apropos: “intender” refers to a person who is estimated, based on their browsing 
behavior, as being close to the point of making a purchase.  Thus showing an ad to an “intender” 
might be especially likely to influence a purchase decision. 
                                                 
20
 The digiday:NETWORKS and digiday:TARGET conferences in New York, June 2009.  See also 
http://www.digidaynetworks.com/ and http://www.digidaytarget.com/. 
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Table 3.  List of behavioral segments offered by AOL21 
Academic-Minded  
Active Gamer  
Affluent  
Apparel Shopper  
Auto Intender  
Auto Intender Custom-
Competitive Set  
Auto Intender-Crossover  
Auto Intender-Hybrid  
Auto Intender-Luxury  
Auto Intender-Midsize  
Auto Intender-Minivan  
Auto Intender-Pickup  
Auto Intender-Sedan  
Auto Intender-Sports Car  
Auto Intender-SUV  
Auto Intender-Used  
Auto Parts Shopper  
Avid Golfer  
Black Voices Audience  
Black Voices/Auto Intender  
Black Voices/Die Hard Sports 
Fan  
Black Voices/Entertainment Buff  
Black Voices/Money Minder  
Black Voices/Moviegoer  
Black Voices/Television Watcher  
Black Voices/Traveler  
Black Voices/Women Audience  
Born to Budget  
Business Decision Maker  
Business IT Influencer  
Business Traveler  
Career Watcher  
Casual Diner  
Computer Intender  
Die Hard Football Fan  
Electronics Shopper  
Entertainment Buff  
Environmentally Minded  
Family Chef  
Family Planner  
Geared for Games  
Health Seeker  
Healthy Moderation  
Home Decor Shopper  
Home Improvement Shopper  
Insurance Intender  
Investors  
Latino Audience  
Latino/Auto Intender  
Latino/Die Hard Sports Fan  
Latino/Entertainment Buff  
Latino/Money Minder  
Latino/Women Audience  
Mobile/Wireless Intender  
Money Minder  
Mortgage Intender  
Motor Sports Fanatic  
Motorcycle Intender  
Moviegoer  
Moviegoer - Action/Adventure  
Moviegoer - Comedy  
Moviegoer - Family & Children  
Moviegoer - Horror  
Moviegoer - Sci-Fi  
Music Enthusiast - Country  
Music Enthusiast - Hip Hop/R&B  
Music Enthusiast - Pop  
Music Enthusiast - Rock  
News Follower  
Outdoor Sportsman  
Pet Lovers  
Primed to Purchase  
Ready for Showtime  
Real Estate Intender  
Retirement Planner  
Small Business Owner  
Style Maven  
Sweepstakes  
Technology Maven  
Traveler  
Traveler - Cruises  
Traveler - Flights  
Traveler - Hotels  
Traveler - Rental Cars  
Trendy Homemaker  
Tuned to Travel  
Wired for Electronics 
 
 
 
The AOL segments are likely to be relatively large (on the order of hundreds of thousands or 
potentially millions of people).  However, other systems may segment users into much smaller 
categories, sometimes called “microsegments” or “nanosegments”22, which might comprise only 
a few thousand people. 
 
The following section will examine in more detail the methodology underlying behavioral 
targeting – except for how the data is collected, which is explained in Chapter 4. 
3.2.1 How behavioral targeting is implemented 
Generally, behavioral targeting makes use of statistical techniques, in a couple of ways.  One is 
clustering, which groups users into categories based on common aspects of their browsing 
                                                 
21
 Source: AOL, http://www.platform-a.com/advertiser-solutions/audience-targeting/behavioral-
targeting/audience-behaviors, accessed July 17, 2009 
22
 For an example, see DataXu, a startup company offering a “real-time bidding” platform.  
http://dataxu.com/benefits.php  
36 
 
behavior.  Then if you observe that some of the users in a category have clicked on an ad, the 
system might display the same ad to the other users in a category.  Also, the system can look for 
correlations between users’ browsing behavior and ad clicks or purchases23.  Any time a user sees 
an ad, the user's response (or lack thereof) to that ad can be recorded and added to the user’s 
profile.  The system then tries to identify what aspects of the users’ browsing behavior are most 
strongly correlated with clicking or purchasing.  These correlations could be relatively simple, 
such that people who spend a lot of time on health websites are most likely to purchase particular 
home health care products; but they could also be more complex correlations involving multiple 
aspects of browsing behavior.  As a random example, the system might notice that people who 
read about health-care reform and herbal teas are more likely to click on ads for low-risk mutual 
funds.  This would suggest some new kinds of customers for the mutual fund company to 
consider, or at least some new places to advertise. 
 
One may categorize behavioral targeting systems according to whether they are category-based 
or unstructured.  A category-based system allows advertisers to specify particular categories of 
people they would like to reach, by choosing from a list like the one from AOL.  An unstructured 
system, on the other hand, simply looks for statistical correlations between browsing behavior 
and a particular desired outcome, such as clicking on an ad.  The system attempts to “learn” what 
kinds of browsing behavior are associated with a click, and need not explicitly classify users into 
a categorization scheme like the one given above.  An advertiser would not (and could not) 
specify what kinds of people he is interested in reaching.  The system would just assume that 
people that click on the ad are the people the advertiser wants to reach.  Also, one can imagine 
hybrid systems which first classify users into categories, and then use unstructured methods to 
distinguish between different users in a category.  In other words, Dick and Jane might both fall 
in the category of “Health Seeker”, but be interested in different kinds of health-related ads.  A 
hybrid system would show them different kinds of health-related ads based on the specific kinds 
of health websites they visit, whereas a pure category-based system would be limited in the kinds 
of distinctions it can make between users.  The ultimate extreme of an unstructured system is one 
that produces a different set of profiles for each ad.  It then takes some ‘training’ for each 
individual ad to identify the kinds of behaviors associated with clicks on that particular ad.  For 
example, each pharmaceutical ad might have a different profile of associated behaviors.   
 
The distinction between category-based and unstructured systems will be important later, when 
discussing the kinds of control users might exercise over ad targeting.  It also influences how the 
behavioral targeting system might be used.  With a category-based system, lists of users falling 
into particular categories may be sold to any interested party, much in the way that mailing lists 
are sold for direct marketing purposes.  Category-based systems thus enable the functional 
separation of data analysis and ad placement, whereas unstructured systems are more suited to an 
integrated business model where data analysis and ad placement are performed by the same 
party. 
 
                                                 
23
 There are other kinds of data that could conceivably be used for behavioral targeting, such as individuals’ postings 
on blogs, conversations on social networks, and other kinds of user-generated content.  Simply knowing who an 
individual is talking to online may be useful information, to understand how networks and communities influence 
individuals’ consumption decisions.  But it does not appear that targeting systems are currently making use of such 
information. 
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It is also conceivable that behavioral activity could be used to predict demographic variables 
such as age and income, so that ads can be targeted based on such demographics even when it is 
not possible to ask every user to report his or her age and income (Hu, Zeng, Li, Niu, & Chen, 
2007).  In other words, if a user visited many websites oriented towards seniors, the system 
might guess that the user falls into a 65+ demographic.  This is one example of category-based 
targeting.  It also indicates how behavioral data could be used to produce general audience 
measurements for websites without the sampling biases of a survey panel; all visitors to a 
website could be classified based on their browsing behavior. 
3.3 Pricing 
There are several ways of pricing online advertisements.  One common method is CPM or cost-
per-mille impressions, where an “impression” is one viewing of an ad.  In other words, payment 
is based simply on the number of people that see an ad.  Another common payment option is 
CPC or cost-per-click, where the advertiser pays only when a person clicks on an ad.  A CPM 
rate is the price per thousand impressions; thus, a $3 CPM means that for every thousand people 
that see an ad, the advertiser pays $3.  On the other hand, a CPC rate is the price for a single 
click.  For both CPC and CPM, quoted figures tend to be of the same order of magnitude -- 
single-digit or at most double-digit numbers of dollars.  For example, the self-service advertising 
system of the New York Times offers a starting CPM of $8, which increases in $2.50 increments 
as the targeting becomes more specific (e.g., a $10.50 CPM to target California residents)24. 
 
The choice of CPM or CPC is usually based on the advertiser's objectives for the campaign.  An 
advertiser who is simply interested in increasing awareness of its brand may prefer to pay on a 
CPM basis, because its goal is to have large numbers of people see the ad.  On the other hand, if 
the goal of an ad campaign is to get consumers to buy a product, register on a site or perform 
some other kind of action, the advertiser may prefer to pay on a CPC basis.  A further elaboration 
of the CPC payment model is the CPA or cost-per-action model, in which the advertiser pays 
only when a person performs some action (such as registering or purchasing) on the advertiser's 
site.   
 
When viewed in terms of the risk taken by the network or publisher receiving the ad payment, a 
CPM arrangement gives the lowest risk, because the network is guaranteed to receive revenue 
once ads are displayed.  CPA gives the greatest risk for the network, because payment is 
contingent upon factors which are to some extent beyond the control of the network, such as 
users' interest in the product being advertised.  The risk level of a CPC arrangement lies in the 
middle: it is riskier than CPM for a network, but not as risky as CPA.  If the network has some 
historical data indicating which users are more likely to click on a given ad, it may be able to 
reduce this risk. 
 
One report estimates that about 57% of 2008 ad spending (or about $13.3 billion) was priced on 
a performance basis, i.e. CPC or CPA (Interactive Advertising Bureau & 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009).  Given that most or all of the spending on search advertising 
and lead generation is CPC, this would suggest that most display advertising was priced CPM.   
                                                 
24
 New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/marketing/selfservice/help.html, accessed June 17, 2009 
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ComScore estimates that U.S. Internet users viewed a total of 4.5 trillion display ads in 2008, or 
about 2,000 ads per month for the average user (comScore, 2009).  Given that about $6.5 billion 
was spent on display ads, the average CPM across all display ads would be $1.44.   By 
comparison, another report estimated average CPMs for newspapers, magazines and TV to be in 
the $5 to $10 range25.  Thus, on a CPM basis, display advertising is on average less expensive 
than its offline equivalents.  However, the averages obscure a great amount of variability.  TV 
networks may receive CPMs in the $40 to $90 range for major sporting events26.  Likewise, 
targeted online advertising can yield higher CPMs.  For example, LinkedIn, a networking site for 
professionals, quotes CPMs in the $60-$70 range for ads targeted to corporate executives, IT 
professionals, and other categories of users27.  On the other end of the spectrum, publishers 
working through ad networks may receive CPMs below $128.   
 
There is little data on how much of the total ad spend is taken by networks, and how much is 
passed on to publishers, but one network states publicly that it shares 70% of gross revenues with 
publishers29. 
 
Table 4 gives an idea of revenues that several leading publishers received over the course of a 
year for display and video ads.  Note that the ad revenue from a thousand average users over the 
course of an entire year is not much higher than the market-wide average CPM of $1.44, because 
the average user views just a few ads.  Presumably there is a small subset of users that generates 
most of the ad revenue. 
 
 
                                                 
25
 eMarketer, “US Advertising CPM, by Media, 2008” (Feb 1, 2009), accessed November 22, 2009.  Source: 
Jefferies & Company, Media Dynamics 
26
 eMarketer, “Average Network TV Advertising Pricing for Major US Sporting Events, 2008 (thousands and CPM)” 
(Mar 10, 2009), accessed November 22, 2009.  Source: TNS Media Intelligence 
27
 LinkedIn advertising rate card, 
http://download.linkedin.com/corporate/advertising/pdf/pdf_ratecard.pdf?goback=%2Emml_inbox_none_
DATE_1%2Eail , accessed 29 September 2009 
28
 eMarketer, “Average Advertising Network CPMs for US Websites, by Size, February-July 2008” (Aug 19, 2008), 
accessed November 22, 2009.  Source: PubMatic 
29
 Casale Media website, “The Network Model: A Continuous Value Cycle”,  
http://www.casalemedia.com/network_model/, accessed June 17, 2009 
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Table 4.  Display and video advertising metrics for leading publishers, Dec. 2006 - 
Nov. 200730 
Advertising 
revenues 
(millions) 
Unique users 
(thousands) 
Ad revenue 
per 1000 
users 
Page views 
(thousands) 
Ad revenue 
per 1000 
page views 
Yahoo! $1,375.90  108,734 $12.65  33,425,115 $0.04  
MSN $422.80  95,594 $4.42  14,764,863 $0.03  
AOL Media Network $286.60  91,303 $3.14  7,836,853 $0.04  
MySpace $480.10  57,784 $8.31  30,900,015 $0.02  
Weather Channel $78.80  36,844 $2.14  900,176 $0.09  
About.com $35.80  35,948 $1.00  304,741 $0.12  
MSNBC $250.80  29,230 $8.50  727,221 $0.34  
CNN $71.70  29,144 $2.46  1,204,612 $0.06  
IMDb $78.80  20,653 $3.82  700,601 $0.11  
ESPN $136.20  17,371 $7.84  901,889 $0.15  
 
 
 
A recent analyst report argued that behaviorally-targeted ads account for a relatively small 
portion of the total online advertising spending, estimating it to account for just $0.78 billion of 
ad spending in 2008 (Hallerman, 2008).  Yet, a 2007 survey of marketers revealed that 80% of 
respondents believed that behavioral targeting was an important marketing tactic, and in a 
separate survey, 75% of advertisers and agencies reported that they used behavioral targeting.  
Also, it is likely that the behaviorally-targeted ad spend is now much higher, because Google is 
now using behavioral targeting in its search advertising.  The report quotes a potential $120 CPM 
for a behaviorally-targeted ad, compared to $10 for a non-targeted ad (presumably on a premium 
website, not a long-tail site) – a factor of 12 increase.   
 
For another comparison point, mailing lists used for direct mail campaigns and other kinds of 
customer-relationship marketing can fetch prices in the range of $100 to $300 per thousand 
entries (Direct Marketing Association, 2009) -- a metric which may be compared to CPM.  Of 
course, once the marketer buys the mailing list, he or she can use each address any number of 
times, without any extra cost.  But if the marketer is buying online advertising on a CPM basis, 
he pays for each additional impression.  So even if the behavioral targeting CPM is slightly 
lower, the total costs of the direct mail campaign and the online campaign could be comparable, 
if the marketer wants the online users to see an ad several times (or several different ads). 
 
On the other hand, comparing behavioral targeted ads with non-behaviorally targeted online ads, 
the total cost of the behavioral targeting campaign could be cheaper, because while the CPM is 
increased, the number of viewers (and thus the number of impressions) could decrease by a much 
greater factor.  If behavioral targeting reduces the target audience from 100 million to just 1 
million people, the total cost would still be less even if the CPM increases by a factor of ten.  For 
                                                 
30
 eMarketer, “US Online Display and Video Advertising Metrics for Leading* Online Publishers, December 2006-
November 2007” (Feb 4, 2008), accessed November 22, 2009.  Source: Nielsen Online, JPMorgan and industry 
estimates analyzed by OMMA Magazine cited by MediaPost, February 4, 2008 
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this reason, it is possible that behavioral targeting enables advertisers with smaller budgets to 
compete with larger advertisers.  In any case, large advertisers may be more interested in 
reaching a large audience all at once with the same message, making behavioral targeting less 
appealing to them (Hallerman, 2008).  Lastly, this simple math suggests that publishers would 
have to package a large portion of their ad inventory with behavioral targeting in order to make 
an appreciable difference in their revenues.  (A 10x increase in CPM would not help much if it 
only applied to a small fraction of the total inventory.)   
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Chapter 4. Technology 
This chapter discusses the technology underlying behavioral targeting, in order to understand the 
kinds of “identity” that exist in behavioral tracking systems, and the tools available to users to 
avoid tracking.  Cookies, site registration and ISP monitoring are the key technological concepts 
to understand.  The chapter then explains which parties are involved in displaying ads and 
responding to ad clicks, in order to identify what data is available to the different parties.   
 
One caveat before starting: the description here of technological means of user resistance should 
not be taken in any way as an assumption that these tools are actually being used.  Most users are 
not aware of these tools.  The goal here is to illustrate what would be possible should more users 
become aware of the tools available to them. 
 
Table 5 summarizes the various modes of tracking that will be discussed.  The key points on 
which they differ are: whether tracking is separate from the display of ads, the means by which 
users can resist tracking and/or identification, and the kind of identity assigned to users.  All of 
the technical terms in this table will be explained as the discussion proceeds; the table is 
provided here as a map or framework for the discussion.  As will become clear, some 
mechanisms allow a user to be identified as they move between multiple sites/publishers (a 
shared identity), whereas others only allow a user to be tracked within a single site.  As soon as 
the user moves to a new site, he or she appears as a new user to the tracking system. 
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Table 5.  Tradeoffs between various mechanisms for user tracking 
Scenario 
# 
Technical 
mechanism 
Advertising integrated 
with tracking / data 
collection? 
User resistance 
mechanism 
Shared third-party 
identity, or 
publisher first-
party identity? 
1 Ad network Yes Plug-in Shared 
2 First-party disguise of 
ad network 
Yes Plug-in, but 
potentially more 
difficult  
Publisher 
3 Web bug / tracking 
pixel 
No Plug-in Shared 
4 Web bug / tracking 
pixel with first-party 
disguise 
No Plug-in, but 
potentially more 
difficult 
Publisher 
5 Back-end data sharing No No Publisher 
6 ISP monitoring Yes and no (both are 
possible) 
Encrypting all 
traffic, and/or 
anonymizing 
routing (Tor) 
Shared (ISP 
identity) 
 
 
 
4.1 Basics of web browsing 
Users use software called “web browsers”, such as Mozilla Firefox and Internet Explorer, to 
access web sites.  When the user wishes to visit a website, he or she enters the name of the 
website into the browser, and the browser in turn contacts the website, sending a piece of 
information known as a request or call.  The request includes, at a minimum, an identifying 
string for a particular webpage, known as a URL.  A URL on the New York Times website, for 
example, may be http://www.nytimes.com/ref/membercenter/help/privacy.html.  
“Http” is a standard prefix found at the beginning of all URLs.  The next portion of the URL, 
www.nytimes.com, is called the domain name and identifies which web server stores this 
webpage.  The remainder of the URL identifies a particular page on the website.  The request 
may also include other pieces of data, such as an identifier for the user (which will be discussed 
below). 
 
The website responds to the request with the content of the webpage, in a format known as 
HTML (HyperText Markup Language), which includes the text of the webpage, but not the 
images and videos.  Rather, the HTML includes additional URLs that identify the location of the 
images and videos, and the browser must download them separately.   These images may come 
from the publisher’s web server, or from a web server operated by another organization or 
company, such as the web server of an ad network.  The browser then makes additional 
connections to all of the web servers containing images on the page, and downloads those 
images.  Thus opening a single web page may involve any number of separate connections to 
separate websites.  The domain name that the user requests access to, and which provides the 
initial HTML webpage, is referred to as the first-party domain (“nytimes.com” in the above 
example).  Any other domains that provide portions of the webpage content are referred to as 
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third-party domains (such as the domains of advertising networks). 
 
Some web browsers allow users to install third-party software, called plug-ins, that modify or 
augments the browser’s capabilities in a variety of ways.  Among other things, plug-ins can 
prevent many kinds of advertising from appearing on the user’s screen31.  This flexibility or 
generativity (Zittrain, 2006) in the web environment arises from the fact that the web is built 
upon open communications protocols that are not controlled by any single company or actor.  
Openness allows the development of browsers like Mozilla Firefox that in turn can be extended 
or modified by plug-ins.  If the web was based upon a closed protocol controlled by a single 
company, that company could control the kinds of plug-ins or extensions available to the 
browser, potentially reducing the options available to users and the control they could exercise 
over advertising and tracking.   
4.2 Identity: IP addresses and cookies 
If a request contained only a URL and no other information, the website would have no way to 
distinguish between different users or even different computers.  All users would see the exact 
same webpage.  However, the web request does in fact include two kinds of additional 
information used to identify particular users: an IP address and cookies. 
4.2.1 IP addresses 
The IP (Internet Protocol) address is a set of numbers that identifies a computer on a network, for 
purposes of routing information between computers.  All computers on the Internet have an IP 
address, and (to a first approximation) all computers should have a unique IP address used by no 
other computer.   
 
In practice, there are ways to masquerade and manipulate IP addresses so that many different 
computers “appear” to the outside world to have the same IP address.  This can be done for 
security reasons, or to conserve IP addresses, which are finite in number and thus becoming a 
scarce resource.  In addition, even if an IP address identifies a single computer, it will not 
distinguish between different users on that computer.  If a family shares a computer, the mother, 
father and all of the children will all be using the same IP address.  Thus a system that uses IP 
address as an identifier will not be able to distinguish between these different individuals. 
 
Finally, IP addresses are not guaranteed to be stable long-term identifiers; they may change from 
day to day or even more frequently.  Thus they can not be used to identify households over a 
long period of time. 
4.2.2 Cookies 
Cookies are critical to the tracking of users within and across sites.  This is because without 
cookies, a web server has no way to distinguish different people from each other, except with 
their IP address, and as noted above, the IP address is an unreliable identifier.  The cookie is what 
                                                 
31
 See the AdBlock Plus plug-in, at http://adblockplus.org/en/ . 
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gives a web site “memory” of a particular user32. 
 
Suppose that Alice goes to a news website and reads an article about South Africa.  When Alice 
connects to the website, the website tells Alice’s browser to store a piece of information that 
looks something like “userID: 98fsglk32”.  “98fsglk32” is a random string that has no meaning, 
except that it distinguishes one person from another.  When Jane accesses the same website to 
read an article about polar bears, the website tells Jane’s browser to store a different piece of 
information: “userID: 74ahjn09”.  The website can then build a database of the topics about 
which different users have read; in simplified form, it may look like this: 
 
User ID Article subject 
98fsglk32 South Africa 
74ahjn09 polar bears 
 
When Alice next goes to the website, her browser sends the user ID of “98fsglk32” to the 
website, so that the site can search for this ID in its database and learn that this person already 
looked at an article about South Africa.  It can use this information in a variety of ways, for 
example by showing a listing entitled “Topics You Have Recently Read About” on the right-hand 
side of the webpage.  In Alice’s case, this list would include “South Africa”; in Jane’s case it 
would include “polar bears”.  Note that the website does not know Alice or Jane’s name or any 
other aspect of their identities; it only knows the topics they have previously read about.   
 
These pieces of information like “userID: 98fsglk32” are called cookies.  Each cookie has a 
name (for example, “userID”) and some content (e.g. “98fsglk32”).  Furthermore, cookies are 
associated with the domain name of a website (e.g. “nytimes.com”) such that only that website 
has access to the information from that cookie.  When Alice goes to another site, for example 
Facebook, her browser does not send the user ID “98fsglk32” to Facebook.  Facebook must 
create its own cookie for Alice, for example “userID: yucca12”, that is not shared with the news 
website (unless particular programming techniques are used, which will be discussed below).  In 
addition, the process of depositing and transmitting cookies occurs entirely automatically as the 
user accesses web content, and normally there is no visual indication to the user that the website 
has assigned him or her an identity that allows for tracking.  (There are ways for users to learn 
how they have been labeled, which will be discussed below.)   
 
Cookies are not used only by websites such as the New York Times or Facebook, but also by the 
advertising networks showing ads on those sites.  Each ad network has a separate set of cookies 
for the same person, so the Microsoft ad network might identify Alice as “userID: mnm156” 
while the Yahoo network identifiers her as “userID: ufskjb6”.  Furthermore, a user can have 
multiple cookies from a given website or ad network.  The news site may have a cookie “userID: 
934280clkjs”, and another cookie “websiteColor: red”, as a way of remembering the user’s 
preferred color for the website.  As this illustrates, not all cookies are used for distinguishing 
between individual users; some cookies assist in the customization of an individual user’s 
website experience. 
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 Actually, it is technologically feasible to design a website that has knowledge of user identity, but does not use 
cookies (by including a user ID as part of the URL of every page).  However, very few websites are designed this 
way.  Using cookies to track identity is much easier. 
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Sites that use cookies to identify users may do so in one of two ways: either by automatically 
generating an identifier for each user (as in the first example with the news website) or by asking 
users to register with the site and thereby create their own user ID.  In the latter case, the cookie 
may contain the user’s own chosen ID.  Cookies are necessary in order for users to register and 
sign in to sites; if the browser did not use cookies, sign-in would be impossible.   
4.3 Cookie management and other advanced techniques 
This section discussed the various ways that users can control how cookies are used for tracking, 
and also some techniques publishers and ad networks can use to get around some of the 
restrictions initially associated with cookies. 
4.3.1 User control of cookies 
A key implication of the way cookies are designed is that the browser is not actually required to 
record the cookies provided by websites.  The browser can in fact ignore the website’s request to 
store the information.  In the example of the news website, this would prevent the website from 
remembering the previously-read articles.  Browsers generally give users some control over the 
storage of cookies through configuration options in the browser’s Preferences section.  By 
default, browsers generally accept most cookies, but if the user wishes, he or she may tell the 
browser to refuse all cookies, thus preventing websites from tracking them or having any 
“memory”.  However, disabling cookies altogether will generally limit the functionality of many 
websites, because as mentioned above, disabling cookies will prevent a user from being able to 
log in to most websites.  For example, an online retailer would not be able to remember the items 
you previously looked at, or the items in your shopping cart.   
 
In the middle of the spectrum, between full acceptance and full refusal of cookies, one may tell 
the browser to accept cookies only from certain websites, or to accept cookies from all websites 
except for specific “blacklisted” sites.  However, this presents an extra burden for the user, 
because for every site he visits and every ad network used by those sites, he must make a 
judgment about whether he wants to allow cookies or not.  An alternative is to use a browser 
plug-in that manages this task automatically for the user. In this case, the plug-in may examine 
each cookie that a website or ad network asks to leave in the browser, and compare it with a 
database of the domain names associated with “good” and “bad” cookies33.  For example, the 
database may indicate that cookies from “adnetwork.com” and “usertracker.com” should be 
blocked, and cookies from all other domains may be allowed. 
 
Privacy-enabling browser plug-ins are generally designed by volunteers as open-source projects, 
in an adversarial relationship with the publishers and networks.  The plug-in developers must 
“reverse engineer” some of the mechanisms of how the networks track users, and must 
continually update the plug-ins as networks and publishers change their code and redesign their 
systems.  Thus there is an ongoing “arms race” between the data collectors and the pro-privacy 
developers. 
                                                 
33
 For an example, see the Targeted advertising cookie opt-out (TACO) plug-in, http://taco.dubfire.net/ . 
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Even without a plug-in, browsers generally allow users to look at all of the cookies deposited by 
websites, and delete individual ones.  Thus users may also allow websites and ad networks to 
leave cookies, but periodically delete them, so that websites can track them over the short term 
but not the long term.  One study by comScore, focusing on a Yahoo cookie and a DoubleClick 
ad network cookie, estimated that about 30% of users deleted one of those cookies during a one-
month time period (Abraham, Meierhoefer, & Lipsman, 2007).   
 
Although websites and networks can not force users to accept cookies, they can detect that their 
cookies are being blocked; thus, publishers and networks do have some information about how 
often it happens. 
 
One way for advertising networks to work around the problem of cookie deletion is to use a 
different kind of cookie, associated with the Adobe Flash program.  Flash is a browser plug-in 
widely used for showing video or making other forms of interactive webpages.  In addition, 
websites (and ad networks) can use Flash to store information on user’s computers and then send 
it back to the website when the user next connects to the site, essentially duplicating the 
browser’s cookie mechanism.  These “Flash cookies” are stored in a separate location from 
regular browser cookies, and fewer tools are available to control them (Soltani, Canty, Mayo, 
Thomas, & Hoofnagle, 2009).  Also, fewer users are aware of their existence.  
4.3.2 JavaScript, and identity linkage between publishers and ad networks 
In the above discussion of cookies, it was stated that the publisher can not see the cookies for the 
ad network, and the ad network does not see the cookies created by the publisher.  This technical 
restriction would make it difficult for the publisher and ad network to share data about the user, 
because they would each have a separate ID for the user.  Thus the publisher and network would 
be unable to combine their knowledge about the user’s behavior into a larger composite picture.  
However, there is a technological way to get around this restriction: JavaScript. 
 
JavaScript is a programming language that operates within the web browser.  The publisher can 
include JavaScript code within the HTML page that is executed by the browser upon 
downloading the page.  Among other things, the code may combine information (such as 
cookies) from multiple websites.  The browser may send a request to network A, asking “what is 
the user’s ID in network A?”  Network A then returns an identifying string like “49295”.  The 
JavaScript may then include this user ID in a call to network B, effectively saying to network B: 
“this user has ID ‘49295’ in network A.”  Network B of course knows its own ID for the user, 
e.g. “aj411”, so now it can cross-reference users between the two networks.  It now knows that 
the person with ID “49295” in network A is the same person identified as “aj411” in its own 
system.  The ability to cross-reference users between different networks is critical to the 
functioning of an ad exchange, because it allows the exchange to tell the networks: “this user is 
about to see an ad; for network A, his ID is …, for network B, his ID is …; what price are you 
willing to pay to show the ad?”  The networks can then bid against each other for the right to 
show an ad to the user. 
 
However, if users install a browser plug-in that blocks the ad network cookies, the cross-
referencing of the user would still be prevented, because the user would not have an ID cookie 
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for either network.  In such a scenario, it is conceivable that a network could make use of an ID 
associated with a publisher, one that was not blocked.  In other words, if the user was signed into 
the Fox News website with an ID of “sopchak”, other sites could use JavaScript to access that ID 
and then send it to ad networks for ad targeting, so that the ad network need not leave a cookie.  
However, this would require a business relationship between the publisher and the network 
(which is certainly imaginable if the network is a vertical network associated with a publisher). It 
is not known how often this happens. 
4.3.3 DNS aliasing: obscuring third-party servers 
One way that a publisher could use a third-party ad network for displaying advertisements, while 
still working around plug-ins that attempt to block such ads or tracking, is to use a DNS alias to 
“disguise” the third-party ad server as  a first-party server (Krishnamurthy & Wills, 2009).  This 
involves giving the third-party server “adnetwork.com” another name like 
“otherserver.nytimes.com”.  The request for the ad banner would then go to 
“otherserver.nytimes.com”, which the plug-in would be less likely to find on its blacklist; in 
other words, the plug-in would think that the ad banner was actually part of the content of the 
page.  However, this would force the ad network to make use of the cookies from the publisher’s 
domain rather than its own cookies, and again raise the question of how to track a user as it 
moves from one site to another. 
4.4 Tracking is separate from advertising: web bugs and tracking pixels 
Thus far it has been implicitly assumed that tracking or observation of a user’s behavior occurs 
when an ad is displayed.  But in fact, tracking and ad display are independent activities.  It is 
possible for a behavioral tracking system to observe a user’s behavior without showing an ad, by 
means of a web bug or tracking pixel.  These are two different names for the same mechanism, in 
which the HTML of the publisher’s web page includes a call to download an invisible image 
from the tracking system’s server (or, JavaScript code could call the tracking server, but the end 
result is the same).  The image is a one pixel-by-one pixel image of the same color as the 
background of the page, so it does not change how the page appears.  But the call to the tracking 
system’s server notifies the tracker that a user has visited a particular page on the publisher’s site, 
so that the tracker can record this step in the user’s browsing trail.  In terms of the 
communications between the browser and the tracking system, the web bug is no different from 
an ad; the only difference is that there is no visual indicator to the user that the communication is 
occurring.  The call to the tracking system includes whatever identifying cookies the browser has 
for that tracker, so the tracker can distinguish between different users.   
4.5 Publisher tracking with server logs, and back-end data sharing 
Websites generally keep a record, called a server log, of all of the activity on their sites.  The log 
includes the URL of each page that was accessed, when it was accessed, and the IP address and 
cookies of the user accessing each page.  If the user disables cookies for the website, the only 
remaining user identifier is the IP address, which as discussed above, is somewhat unreliable.  
However, if the site has a sign-in process to enable user customization, the user may not want to 
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disable cookies.  Thus as long as the user wishes to access personalized features of a website, he 
must implicitly consent to at least allowing the publisher to track and record his behavior on the 
site.   
 
In addition, the publisher may share this behavioral data with a third party “behind the scenes” 
simply by sending the data from its servers to the third party’s servers.  The user’s browser could 
not block the data transmission because it does not involve the browser at all.  In this case, the 
user would be identified by his user ID on the publisher site.  If the user moved to a different site, 
he would now have a different ID and there would be no way for the third party to know that 
these two different user IDs actually identified the same person.   
 
Thus, third parties could aggregate behavioral data from a number of different publishers in a 
way that browser plug-ins could not block, but they would face the challenge of reconciling the 
user IDs from the various publishers. 
4.6 ISP monitoring 
The ISP can see all of its users’ connections, every site they are connecting to, and the 
information they send to those sites and the information they get back – with the exception of 
encrypted communications, which are generally used when making purchases online, accessing 
bank accounts or other sensitive information.  (Of course, this only applies to the ISP’s 
subscribers; Time Warner can not observing the complete browsing behavior of a Comcast 
customer.)  By contrast, the data available to ad networks, exchanges, publishers and agencies 
are all limited to a particular set of webpages (as will be discussed later in this chapter).  
Furthermore, unlike ad networks and some publishers, the ISP also knows the user’s name and 
street address, making it possible to cross-reference data the ISP collects about a user with data 
from other sources. 
 
The limit at one point had been on the ability of ISPs to store the massive amounts of data that 
was flowing through their networks.  However, ISPs are increasingly considering the use of 
“deep packet inspection” (DPI) systems which filter and analyze this data.  The current limits on 
ISP behavior are legal and political, as discussed earlier.  Without these restraints, it is possible 
for ISPs to produce behavioral profiles matched to street address, which then can be linked to 
other databases of purchase activity by street address. 
 
There are ways for users to escape the ISP’s eyes, by routing all of their traffic through an 
encrypted proxy such as Tor34, but these again are cumbersome and not widely-known. 
4.7 Summary: the cookie arms race, and some empirical data 
To summarize, the original design of cookies was intended to prevent multiple sites from being 
able to share information and cross-reference users.  However, technological developments have 
eroded that restriction, and it is relatively easy for publishers and ad networks to cross-reference 
                                                 
34
 http://www.torproject.org/  
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users.  There are tools (plug-ins) available to users to limit this cross-referencing process, and 
prevent their activity from being tracked by particular sites or networks.  However, if a site 
requires sign-in to access content or services, the user has no way to limit the site’s ability to 
track behavior.  The user also has no means to prevent the publisher from sharing user behavioral 
data with other websites or ad networks.  In addition, third-party trackers can disguise 
themselves from plug-ins with DNS aliasing, although this makes it more difficult to track users 
as they move between different publishers. 
 
Table 5 summarizes the tradeoffs associated with the various scenarios for user tracking. 
 
Scenario #1 is the case in which an ad network uses a third-party cookie associated with its own 
domain to track users.  In this case, the collecting of data about the user occurs at the same time 
as the ad is displayed.  Browser plug-ins can block the ad display and collection of data.  The ad 
network assigns its own ID to the user, which persists as the user moves between multiple sites. 
 
Scenario #2 is the case in which the ad network server is disguised with a DNS alias such that it 
appears to be a first-party server in the domain of the publisher.  Again, the data collection occurs 
at the same time as ad display.  However, the user is now identified by an ID that is publisher-
specific; as the user moves between sites, his ID changes. 
 
Scenario #3 is the case of a web bug or tracking pixel which records data about the user without 
displaying an ad.  In all other respects, it is the same as scenario #1.  Scenario #4 is the case of a 
web bug disguised with a DNS alias.  Data is collected without an ad being displayed, but in all 
other respects, it is the same as scenario #2. 
 
Scenario #5 refers to data sharing between a publisher server and a third party server without any 
browser involvement.  Data collection is again separate from ad display, and there is no way for 
the user to block the data collection.  The publisher user ID identifies the user. 
 
Finally, scenario #6 refers to the case of ISP monitoring.  The ISP may collect user data whether 
or not it displays the ads.  The user must encrypt his traffic in order to avoid monitoring.  The 
ISP has an account number and street address from which the user is connecting, a relatively 
strong kind of identity that persists as the user moves between different sites. 
 
There is some empirical data on the use of third-party tracking and advertising servers by 
popular websites (Krishnamurthy & Wills, 2009).  This study’s authors have collected data on 
the usage of third-party services by the 1200 most popular websites35 over the past several years, 
through September 2008.  They then identified the top third-party service providers, measured by 
the number of popular websites which make use of them (see Table 6).  These third-party 
services include not just advertising networks, but also web analytics services; in fact, among the 
top third-party services were the Google, Omniture and Quantcast analytics services.  As of 
September 2008, Google services reached almost 60% of the top websites.  Some of these sites 
use only Google Analytics, others use only DoubleClick, and others use both.  No player had 
nearly that level of market share a few years ago; before the Google / DoubleClick merger, they 
were each reaching around 20% of sites.  
                                                 
35
 As measured by Alexa, a free web measurement service. 
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Table 6.  Most common third-party services used by publisher sites in Sept. 2008, 
from Krishnamurthy and Wills (2009)36 
Third-party service provider Percentage of 
publisher sites using 
third-party service 
Google (including DoubleClick and 
Google Analytics) 
60% 
Omniture 28% 
Microsoft 22% 
Yahoo 15% 
AOL 14% 
Quantcast 13% 
Audience Science / Revenue Science 9% 
 
 
 
Note that the actual penetration of third-party services could potentially be higher than these 
numbers indicate, because the authors may only have visited a few pages on each site.  If more 
pages were visited, at different times and from different locations, more third-party services 
might have been observed.  This fact may explain why these numbers are inconsistent with the 
comScore reach figures listed in Table 2.  ComScore reports that there are around 20 distinct ad 
networks that reach at least half of the US internet-browsing population.  In other words, all 20 
of those networks serve at least one ad to half of the population in the course of a month.  
However, the above study would indicate that most of those 20 networks do not reach a major 
portion of the top websites.  It is possible that the networks may only be used on particular pages 
that the study did not visit, or that other methodological issues prevented detection of those 
networks37.  Or, perhaps some of those networks are focused almost exclusively on lesser-known 
sites not tested in the study.  This illustrates some of the difficulties with empirical data 
collection for online advertising: because ad targeting is increasingly based on the complex 
interaction of a wide range of variables, it is necessary to test a wide range of scenarios to collect 
accurate data.  
4.8 Ad networks, exchanges and data visibility 
Technical architectures determine not only the modes of user resistance, but also the kinds of 
data available to various stakeholders.  This section illustrates this point by means of several 
scenarios.  
 
The next diagram illustrates three scenarios for the sequence of connections that are made in 
order to display ads and click on ads.  The solid lines represent communications that occur when 
the ad is displayed, and the dashed lines represent communications that occur only if the ad is 
clicked.   
                                                 
36
 Data comes from the text of section 4.3 and figure 7 in the cited paper. 
37
 It is possible that the study failed to detect those other networks because it is necessary to follow a series of HTTP 
redirects to identify the true source of the ads, and the study did not follow those redirects.  
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The first scenario illustrates what happens if a publisher is serving an ad that has been sold 
directly to an advertiser (without the involvement of a network).  In this case, the publisher’s 
web server provides the ad image to the browser.  If the user clicks on the ad, the browser 
contacts the publisher’s web server again, and this server gives the browser the location of the 
advertiser’s website.  The browser then downloads and displays a webpage from the advertiser’s 
site.   
 
The second scenario illustrates what happens when the ad is placed through a network.  In this 
case, the publisher’s webpage instructs the browser to download the ad image from the ad 
network’s server.  If the user clicks on the ad, the browser contacts the network’s web server 
again, in order to learn the location of the advertiser’s website.  This scenario is very similar to 
the previous scenario, except that the network’s web server provides the ad image, and not the 
publisher’s server.  In addition, note that the publisher does not know which users see which ads, 
because it does not make that decision.   
 
The third scenario, involving an ad exchange, is slightly more complicated.  In this case, the 
browser requests the ad image from the exchange, but the exchange must first contact several ad 
networks in order to determine which network will place the ad.  Once this decision is made, the 
exchange then provides the ad image to the browser.  If the user clicks on the ad, the browser 
contacts the exchange again, which in turn directs the browser to contact the ad network, which 
finally directs the browser to the advertiser’s site.  As in the previous scenario, the publisher does 
not know which ad the user sees.   
 
Also note that in all of these scenarios, the advertiser does not know anything about the users that 
have seen the ad but not clicked on it, unless the publisher, network or exchange provides that 
data to the advertiser.  Thus the technical architecture of the system determines who controls 
access to various kinds of data.  There are scenarios where particular parties may withhold some 
data from other parties.  But it is also entirely possible for a network to share more data with an 
agency or publisher than the data described above, if it feels that it is in its interest to do so.   
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Figure 4.  Illustration of communications involved in displaying and clicking on 
an ad 
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Table 7.  The extent of data available to various actors 
Actor / scenario Pages and users for which data is available 
Agencies—buying directly only those who see their ads 
Agencies—through networks whatever data is shared by the network  
Networks—working directly 
with publishers 
only those who see their ads 
Networks—working through 
an exchange 
any impression the network bids on; if the network loses the bid, it 
knows about the impression, but not whether the user clicked 
Publishers where they place ads directly, and where networks share data 
Invisible observer/tracker, 
using a web bug 
publisher’s choice of pages and users 
ISPs for their subscribers, all pages, except when encryption is used 
 
 
 
The accompanying table summarizes the data that is available to each of the actors in this 
ecosystem.  An agency or network might only have data about the users that saw their ads and 
the pages where the ad was shown.  If an agency’s ad is not shown on a particular page, the 
agency may not know which users visited that page, even if the agency placed ads directly with 
the publisher.  The agency’s only connection with the user is by showing an ad.  Furthermore, if 
an agency is working through a network, it may not even have the complete data about 
everybody who sees an ad.  It is up to the network to decide which data it will and will not share. 
 
If multiple networks are competing to show ads for a publisher via an ad exchange, they may all 
be informed about each impression, so that they can provide a bid price for that impression. Thus 
all of the networks would know that a user has visited a particular page. 
 
Publishers observe the complete browsing trails of users on their sites, but of course know 
nothing about what those users do on other sites.  They also have complete data about ads that 
they place directly, but may have limited data about ads that are placed through networks.   
 
The above discussion is entirely focused on data collection that occurs as part of the display of 
an ad.  When a web bug is used, the data that is collected is entirely up to the choice of the 
publisher, who may choose to place the web bug on as many or as few pages as it likes, and for 
whichever users it chooses. 
 
ISPs can observe the complete browsing history of their subscribers across all websites, except 
when encryption is used (for example, for sensitive transactions like online purchases, accessing 
medical history or financial information).   
 
Finally, it is worth following up briefly on an issue raised in the previous chapter, regarding the 
difficulties with estimating the number of unique users visiting a website (Bermejo, 2007).  Panel 
surveys are used to make these estimates, but as discussed earlier, those estimates are subject to 
sampling biases.  It is also possible for publishers to estimate this number themselves from the 
cookie data recorded in server logs.  However, if users delete their cookies, they will be counted 
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multiple times, leading to overcounting.  Likewise, if the same person accesses the site from 
multiple different computers (at home and at work, for example), he will be counted more than 
once.  On the other hand, if multiple people using the same account on the same computer, they 
will only be counted as one person.  Thus publisher counts of viewership have their own 
problems, aside from the problem that they are hard to verify independently.  Estimates from 
third parties like ad networks and analytics services are also based on cookies, and thus have all 
of the same issues.  It is technically possible for ISPs to make these estimates, which will be 
discussed further in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5. Analysis and Conclusions 
5.1 Introduction 
In the first chapter, the following hypothesis was proposed: the demand for increasingly detailed 
behavioral tracking of users benefits aggregators relative to publishers because the aggregators 
have the economy of scale needed to provide the user data of interest.  This trend would 
concentrate power in the hands of a small number of actors who excel at data mining.  The 
current chapter returns to the hypothesis to assess the likelihood that the evolution of the online 
advertising ecosystem will result in the concentration of data in a small number of hands. In 
order to understand the conditions under which this hypothesis might prove correct, it is 
necessary to consider in more detail the relationships of the stakeholders - ad agencies, 
publishers, ad networks, Internet providers, and finally users – to data and the strategies these 
actors employ for advancing their interests.  The goal here is not to prove the hypothesis true or 
false definitively but rather to highlight some dynamics which policymakers might monitor as 
indications of problems. 
 
One general issue cuts across all of the stakeholders: the struggle for ownership of data.  Data is 
power in the online ecosystem.  Knowledge about who sees ads and who clicks on ads is 
valuable for marketing.  The question of ownership arises wherever intermediaries, such as ad 
networks, place or manage ads on behalf of another party38 (Edelman, 2009; Winterberry Group, 
2009).  The intermediary then has the complete picture of who sees the ads and whether they 
click on them, and as discussed in the previous chapter, can choose to share or not share the 
detailed data with advertisers and publishers (and perhaps even users).  Intermediaries of any sort 
(ad networks or even ad agencies) who work with data on behalf of clients (both advertisers and 
publishers) face conflicting incentives: on the one hand, clients want to know as much as 
possible about where ads are displayed and who sees them; on the other hand, revealing such 
information could threaten intermediaries’ business models – making it possible for clients to 
look for the same services elsewhere – and reveal proprietary information about how the 
intermediaries target ads.   
 
One simple example of data not being shared is ad networks that are not transparent about where 
they show ads.  The advertiser may tell the network to place ads on a certain category of site, but 
does not know which exact sites are included.  Likewise, a publisher who shows ads through a 
network may not have control over which ads appear on the site.  One assumes that advertisers 
want to see as much data as possible to make informed choices about ad buys and placement. 
Apparently, at the moment, the value provided by the networks – in terms of precision of 
targeting, easy access to a large audience, or easy access to a valued audience -- is great enough 
                                                 
38
 Some actors are addressing this issue explicitly in their marketing material.  For example, see 24/7 RealMedia, 
“Online Publishers: Who Owns Your Audience?”, http://www.247realmedia.com/EN-US/intel/research-
opinions.html accessed 6 October 2009.  
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to compensate for the loss in transparency.  But agencies are now building (or acquiring) their 
own networks in order to access the detailed data, among other reasons (McClellan, 2009).  
Furthermore, the networks have knowledge not just about who is seeing what ads, but also how 
much advertisers are willing to pay for them (and, the minimum prices publishers are asking for 
their inventory).  Thus there is another information asymmetry, in knowledge about the 
advertising market itself.  
 
This is not to say that there is a complete hiding of data.  For example, Google’s AdSense 
network does tell publishers which pages receive the most ad revenue.  This potentially gives 
publishers some idea of how to design a site to gain more revenue, which benefits both the 
publisher and Google.  As a simple example, if a publisher gains most of his revenues from the 
sports section of the site, he may try to promote the sports section in other areas.  However, it is 
more difficult to imagine Google (or any other behavioral targeting network) sharing data about 
which users generate the most revenue, both because of privacy concerns and because it might 
reveal valuable information about how the network does its targeting. 
 
The next sections look at each individual stakeholder, and explore the strategies they might 
pursue to improve their positions. 
5.2 Advertisers and ad agencies 
As mentioned earlier, there are four large ad agency holding companies which are responsible for 
the majority of advertising spending in the US.  Thus it is appropriate to ask if these holding 
companies can become large aggregators with market power in their own right, given that they 
are starting to build their own ad networks (McClellan, 2009; Winterberry Group, 2009).   
 
One distinction between agencies and other actors in the ecosystem is that agencies also plan 
campaigns in other media, such as TV, print and radio.  Thus they have more knowledge about 
consumers’ exposure to messaging across all of these different media.  They are working on 
projects which integrate data about consumers’ exposure to media across a wide range of so-
called “touchpoints”, including the media channels described above as well as billboards and in-
store displays.  Based on this knowledge they can estimate how much impact a TV ad or 
billboard has relative to an online ad, for different types of consumers.  In this respect they are 
aggregating data across another dimension: that of media.  It is not clear how individual users are 
identified in these other media forms, where no user registration or sign-in is required in order to 
access content; perhaps users’ viewing of those media are imputed based upon geographical 
location, demographic or other variables.   
 
Within the online environment, agencies can accumulate data from a variety of ad campaigns 
managed via a variety of networks, as well as campaigns managed directly with individual 
publishers. When they go through networks, they may not have access to complete data about 
who saw the ads and who clicked on them, only summary reports.  But when the agency buys 
inventory directly from publishers, it presumably has access to more complete data.  One 
question, however, is whether separate agencies within the same holding company share this 
data; like any large organization, there are complicated internal politics and rivalries.  In 
addition, it is unclear to what extent the agency’s clients, the advertisers, allow the agencies to 
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take data from their campaigns and use it in combination with data from other advertisers. 
Advertisers benefit from analysis of data from a variety of sources, but they may also feel 
reluctant to share this data if it is the product of extensive research and media campaigns. 
 
In addition, even assuming that clients and organizational politics allow for data sharing, there 
remains the technical question of how agencies identify who is the same user across all of these 
different ad networks as well as the other media channels.  The same person will have one ID in 
one network and another ID in another network.  If the agency serves ads from its own ad server, 
this gives yet another ID, and a publisher ad server may assign one more ID.  This suggests that 
if consolidating data from a variety of campaigns and networks is important, there will have to 
be a way to connect all these disparate identities.  Perhaps there are ways to connect these IDs to 
more persistent identities, such as site registrations, retail loyalty cards, membership cards or 
mailing addresses, allowing for the cross-referencing of IDs from different systems. 
 
In short, there are ways in which advertising agencies (or, to be more precise, agency holding 
companies) could themselves become data aggregators with some market power, but there are 
also some forces which might limit the extent of that power. 
5.3 Publishers 
It is possible that groups of publishers within a particular topical area could band together to 
form their own advertising networks, in order to oppose the rise of the aggregators. In this way 
they could control the kinds of data which is available to advertisers about their audiences. This 
has already happened to some extent, with the rise of vertical ad networks focused on specific 
topical areas such as politics and cooking, as well as the ad networks sponsored by large 
publishers such as Fox.  These vertical ad networks would indicate that there are economies of 
scale from aggregating a large number of sites within a given vertical topical area.  The question 
is whether these economies of scale arise specifically from the ability to do behavioral tracking 
across a variety of sites, or from other sources; for example, vertical networks also make it 
possible for an advertiser to reach a large audience without have to make individual deals with 
many sites. 
  
Another option for publishers is to increase their level of engagement with their users, leveraging 
a key advantage that publishers have.  As noted earlier, users have a stronger kind of identity 
with publishers than with networks, because there is no way for users to give up a publisher 
identity without losing personalized functionality.  Ad network cookies and other third-party 
cookies can be blocked with browser plug-ins, but blocking publisher cookies requires giving up 
many of the features users enjoy on websites.  A site that enriches its knowledge of the user’s 
identity can gain more value from selling the data.  This suggests that a key currency for Internet 
publishers will be their “depth of identity”, as illustrated by the following example, based on a 
hypothetical reader of the New York Times (although it would also apply to any other newspaper). 
 
Suppose that the reader is required to register (for free) before accessing the site, in order for the 
site to develop some nominal concept of the user’s identity.  The user could put anyone's name in 
the registration form.  However, suppose he were to subscribe to the print version of the paper.  
Then he must give them his mailing address, and presumably he would not give them a fake 
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address.  Thus the print subscribers are a kind of “premium” customer for the Times, because it 
knows more about them.  It can sell their names and addresses to direct marketers.  And, if it 
connects his identity as a print subscriber with his identity as a web surfer, it can sell even more 
information.  It can say that George Gupschutz on 392 Maiden Lane in Marlborough, MA is an 
avid Chicago Cubs fan, because he always reads the articles about the Cubs.  So now, maybe the 
people selling Chicago Cubs memorabilia will come knocking at his door (or his computer 
screen).  This illustrates how a connection to offline identity (i.e. the mailing address) can 
immediately create value for a publisher. 
 
His browsing trail from the Times may also be combined with browsing trails from other 
websites, if the two parties agree.  The Times could partner with a sports site like ESPN, sharing 
data with one another, in which case they might find that George Gupschutz reads the Cubs 
articles on the Times site, but reads about hockey on the ESPN site.  Perhaps George likes the 
Times' baseball writers more than their hockey writers, and the converse for ESPN.  This might 
give additional information and enrich the profile sold to direct marketers, about the 
consumption of information, and about what writers are more attractive to our consumer.   
 
LinkedIn, a professional networking site, takes the concept of “depth of identity” even further.  
On LinkedIn, each user builds an individual profile focused on their career, employment history 
and professional interests: where they worked, for how long, what their job titles were, and their 
skill areas.  Users have an interest in sharing this information, because hiring managers and 
recruiters are searching LinkedIn for people with the skills and backgrounds they need.  Or, they 
may use LinkedIn as a kind of online rolodex for the networks they have already built, because 
not only does LinkedIn have their resumes, it also knows their contacts: who they have worked 
with, and potentially their friends as well.  So employers can learn that George Gupschutz is a 
friend of Madeleine Zirkowski, and ask Madeleine for her opinion of George.   
 
That explains why George would be motivated to share his information on LinkedIn, information 
that could have several kinds of value for LinkedIn.  It could use this information to display 
targeted advertising; for example, a software company could pay to display an ad to only those 
people who are software engineers or engineering managers.  It can also sell lists of users to 
advertisers.  It may not know George’s mailing address, but it could sell those advertisers his 
cookie ID so that on other sites that George visits, George could see ads connected to his 
LinkedIn profile.  In other words, he could be on the  Times site, and see an ad that is somehow 
related to some piece of information from his profile (and in fact, this is already happening39). 
 
Thus to increase its advertising revenue, the Times might consider how to increase its depth of 
identity.  It might have to transform into a kind of “information experience”, a much more 
personalized news experience, which allows users to indicate which kinds of topics, which 
writers, and what parts of the world interest them the most.  The website would then be 
individually customized based on the expressed interests of the user.  George would see articles 
about Africa on the front page, but his friend Mary would see a mix of sports and business 
articles.  He might vote on the articles he finds especially interesting or uninteresting, and these 
votes could be aggregated statistically with the votes of others in order to make 
                                                 
39
 New York Times, “Privacy Policy” (July 1, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/membercenter/help/privacy.html accessed 24 November 2009 
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recommendations about other articles he might like.  In other words, in the same way that Netflix 
and Amazon recommend books or movies based on what users have read or seen, the Times 
might do likewise with articles.  However, this might mean that it would have to bring in content 
from other sources.  Times content alone might not be rich or diverse enough to create a truly 
individualized experience.  It might be more interesting to analyze individuals’ reading habits 
across several newspapers and blogs, than their reading on a single newspaper.  Readers might 
identify collections of articles from multiple sources that they find to be related or  interesting 
when read together.  The resulting experience might be part blog, part Facebook conversational 
environment.  Social bookmarking and filtering tools such as Delicious, Reddit and Digg make a 
pivot in this direction, although it is not clear if they are attempting to monetize individual 
behavioral activity yet. 
 
Note that both of these projects, the vertical ad network and the integrated information 
experience, require publishers who might normally see themselves as competitors to partner with 
each other, and find some way to share ad revenues.  Thus the logic of behavioral targeting 
pushes publishers towards forming their own aggregators.  It does not represent a challenge to 
the argument that aggregators will become privileged relative to individual publishers; it just 
highlights how different kinds of aggregators can develop, offering different kinds of value 
propositions.  
5.4 Ad networks and exchanges 
Advertising networks and exchanges are currently the aggregators doing the most data 
collection.  The exchanges might in fact change the ways in which networks differentiate 
themselves and the kinds of targeting they offer. 
 
The exchanges force networks to compete more directly against each other, by making it easier 
for advertisers and publishers to switch between networks.  Exchanges also force some level of 
standardization of the features networks provide.  For example, if networks offer category-based 
behavioral targeting, it might be harder for each network to offer its own distinct set of categories 
in an exchange.  Unstructured behavioral targeting, on the other hand, would encounter no such 
problem, because it would operate internally to the network.  Thus the exchange model might 
push towards a one size-fits-all kind of categorical targeting, or else just unstructured targeting. 
 
Exchanges might also change the data that is available to networks.  As noted earlier, the 
exchange knows about the business relationships between publishers and networks: it knows, for 
example, that publisher P sells inventory through networks A, D and G but not networks B and 
C.  Thus when a user visits P’s website, the exchange learns about the user’s visit and informs 
networks A, D and G, who in turn bid for the right to show an ad to the user.  The exchange is a 
kind of “broadcaster” of the ad impression: A, D and G now all know about the user’s visit to the 
site.  Even if A and G lose the auction, the exchange still allows them to observe the user’s 
behavior.  Therefore the exchanges may make more information available to the networks than 
they would have had before.  The only piece of information that is available to just one of the 
networks is the information about whether or not the user clicked on the ad.  If D places the ad, 
only D knows whether the user clicked on the ad. 
 
60 
 
Thus the exchanges raise again the question of the relative value of behavioral data and ad 
inventory.  If behavioral data is valuable to networks A and G, they may not care so much about 
losing the auction, and on balance the exchange helps them.  But if they only care about ad 
placement, then the exchange hurts them because it forces them to compete more directly against 
other networks for the right to place ads.  In short, exchanges may increase the number of parties 
that have access to behavioral data.  This would in turn dilute the value of the data, if 
everybody’s analysis of the data was the same.  However, it could also force more innovation 
and competition with regards to the data analysis.   
 
Another option for networks is to partner more closely with individual publishers, in order to 
make use of the more detailed profiles that publishers have available, integrating that data into 
the networks’ behavioral targeting.  They might try to make exclusivity agreements such that a 
publisher could only work with the one network and not share data with others, if the publisher 
data is valuable.  The proliferation of vertical ad networks suggests that there are some 
advantages from specializing in particular topical areas; in other words, that a more focused 
domain-specific analysis of user behavior yields more useful insights than a non-vertical network 
could produce.   
 
Finally, there is the question of whether the exchange itself is a threat to the networks.  Since the 
exchange is connecting a great number of publishers with a great number of networks and 
advertisers, it also can collect an extensive amount of data about how the different networks 
target users, how users respond to the different targeting strategies of the networks, and what 
advertisers, agencies, and networks are willing to pay for inventory.  It is conceivable that the 
company owning the exchange could use this data to build or aid its own network.  The only 
thing that might prevent this is the exchange’s desire to allow an ecosystem to develop.  The 
exchange might want to encourage a large number of networks or partners to participate in order 
to make the overall market bigger.  As long as no individual network gains enough market power 
to threaten the exchange, the exchange is happy to be a mediator between a large collection of 
small networks. 
5.5 ISPs 
ISPs are looking for a way to capture more value from their content.  They have a challenge of 
become more than just “bit pipes”, providing some extra value, whether to users by offering 
different tiers of content, or to content providers by providing prioritized service, or to 
advertisers by providing additional data.  Content access is a lucrative business; the 2008 cable 
subscription revenues for Time Warner, just one of several large cable operators in the US, were 
$16 billion (Time Warner Inc., 2009), a number comparable in magnitude to the total amount 
spent on online advertising ($23 billion).  However, the cable access market is nearing saturation, 
so it is conceivable that ISPs would be interested in tapping other revenue streams, such as the 
advertising market. 
 
One advantage of ISPs compared to all of the existing advertising networks, publishers and ad 
agencies is that they have a complete view of their users’ traffic (with the exception of encrypted 
communications, for example when users are managing financial accounts or making credit card 
payments online).  All of the existing networks have “holes” in their view of Internet activity – 
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particular websites (or possibly whole categories of websites) that they do not monitor.   
 
At a general level, network providers are in a good position to provide data on general traffic 
patterns: how many people from particular geographical areas are accessing a site at a given 
time.  They could potentially be a credible independent producer of general audience 
measurements, such as the number of unique users visiting websites.  The company Hitwise 
claims to produce such statistics by analyzing traffic data from ISPs.  What is more difficult for 
ISPs to do is sell data about individual users.  As noted earlier, several American ISPs have tried 
to do behavioral advertising, but encountered legal pressure, were forced to testify in Congress, 
and later retreated on these plans.  The legal scholar Paul Ohm (2009) argues that current US 
law, in particular the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, could potentially forbid 
ISPs from monitoring the contents of their traffic, except at the most basic level or in situations 
where the ISP’s property is under threat.  However, the law itself is not clear, and this area of the 
law has not been heavily litigated, so there is some uncertainty about how the courts might 
actually rule. 
 
The core question is how deeply ISPs are allowed to look into the contents of the packets they 
are carrying – and this is where the behavioral advertising issue connects with other regulatory 
and policy issues, specifically network neutrality and the use of deep packet inspection to detect 
illegal distribution of copyrighted content.  Both of these debates are also about the extent to 
which ISPs can examine the traffic moving through their networks.  At one extreme, some argue 
that the ISPs should only be allowed to examine the bare minimum of information necessary to 
route packets: the source and destination IP addresses.  At the other extreme, some ISPs would 
like the ability to offer enhanced services to content providers for particular kinds of content (for 
example, more reliable streaming video).  For example, a video hosting site like YouTube might 
pay Comcast (an ISP) an extra premium to deliver YouTube traffic in a faster or more reliable 
manner than other traffic.  The FCC is currently investigating this issue with the goal of 
producing a set of guidelines about what kind of ISP traffic monitoring and treatment will be 
acceptable and not acceptable.  These guidelines may also influence the extent to which ISPs can 
collect and sell data about users for advertising purposes.  There is no legal prohibition against 
ISPs (or any other kind of player in this ecosystem) selling user data, only against monitoring. 
 
If a strict kind of network neutrality were imposed, prohibiting ISPs from monitoring the 
contents of packets (in other words, prohibiting “deep-packet inspection” as discussed in Chapter 
4), ISPs would still have be able to examine the source and destination IP addresses, which 
would provide some information.  For all but the smallest websites, the IP address would identify 
which website the household is connecting to, but not the specific webpage.  Thus the ISP could 
observe that a particular household connects to YouTube, Hulu, Amazon or eBay, but not which 
videos were watched or which products were viewed.  (This is analogous to a phone company 
recording the phone numbers that a household has called, but not the contents of the call.)  The 
fact that a particular household often connects to YouTube may not be particularly interesting for 
marketers, because so many households do so, but if the household connects to a less well-
known site (such as a specialty site selling very large men’s shoes) then the information may 
become more valuable precisely because it puts the household in a niche category.  Because the 
ISP knows the household’s address, it could compile and sell mailing lists of households with 
particular interests.  The mailing address would be more valuable than the household’s IP address 
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because a household’s IP address can change, rendering it unreliable for targeting purposes. 
 
On the other hand, if a looser form of network neutrality were imposed, allowing the ISPs to 
look deeper into the content of their users’ traffic, they might be allowed to collect information 
about which pages users were accessing.  Thus network neutrality rules could, in the end, have 
the side effect of legitimizing certain kinds of ISP behavioral profiling. 
 
Another option for ISPs is to get users’ consent to behavioral tracking, for example by offering 
users a cheaper service if users allow the ISP to track their browsing activity.  There are actually 
two models the ISP could use here.  One is for the ISP simply to sell data about individuals’ 
browsing patterns to other ad networks, ad agencies or anyone who is interested.  Another is for 
the ISP to operate its own ad network, using the data it collects.  The latter would be larger 
undertaking, requiring the ISPs to make deals with ad agencies, advertisers and publishers, but is 
still imaginable.  (There have already been cases of ISPs replacing the “real” ads in a website 
with ads of the ISP’s choosing, but it seems like such activity is not sustainable in the long term 
without buy-in from publishers.) 
 
Yet another option is for ISPs to lobby directly to change the law to allow behavioral tracking, 
but it seems that the existing ad networks (including Google and Yahoo) would oppose them, 
potentially mobilizing public outrage against the spectre of ISPs trying to invade users’ privacy.  
However, if the ISPs could offer a compelling case about the value of their behavioral 
advertising solution to enough advertisers and/or large content providers, they might be able to 
push through such a change. 
 
It is also interesting to note that ISPs are pursuing a kind of targeted advertising in another 
context already: cable TV.  As mentioned earlier, Project Canoe is attempting to develop a 
unified way for advertisers to target ads through cable networks to specific geographical areas or 
demographic segments.  It also aims to enable interactive advertising, where for example the 
viewer could click a button to request more information about a product.  This will make the TV 
experience more like an online experience.  It also represents a way to capture more information 
about viewers.  The average person in the US still spends much more time on the TV than online 
(Nielsen, 2009a), and the TV experience is seen as more of a passive experience where the user 
may be more receptive to advertising.  This might explain why there are still more ad dollars in 
network and cable TV than the Internet, suggesting why it makes sense for the ISPs to focus on 
TV rather than online advertising. 
 
In short, the question of ISPs’ involvement in behavioral advertising has no simple answer, as 
there are several issues up in the air. 
5.6 Users 
There are three dimensions to this issue: users’ norms, understanding and awareness of privacy 
as an issue; technological options (e.g. privacy-enabling technologies) that allow people to 
conceal their data; and finally, scenarios where users can exert more control over the aggregation 
of data.  
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On the one hand, online platforms encourage sharing of data with ever larger circles of friends.  
On Facebook, a note posted on one’s page is instantly viewable by all of one’s online friends, a 
much larger circle than would normally be possible to reach.  Many of these “friends” may not 
be close friends in the normal sense of the word.  So online activities may encourage a new level 
of sociality and a willingness to share information with others – the question is, will this 
willingness to share be extended to companies and marketers?  In one sense, the Internet blurs 
the line between marketing and conversation.  Users provide non-monetary value to marketers by 
discussing and recommending products to friends (Krauskopf, 2009).  As people come to realize 
the value they provide to brands by discussing their products, they might become more resistant 
to traditional advertising, or come to ask for compensation for their services.   
 
A recent telephone survey found that a majority of people were opposed to marketers tailoring 
advertisements to their interests, especially if it is based on their behavior on other websites or 
offline, and even if it takes places anonymously (Turow, King, Hoofnagle, Bleakley, & 
Hennessy, 2009).  A majority also supported laws that would give people the right to see 
information that websites have collected about them and to request that such information be 
deleted.   It is difficult for individuals to learn about how data about themselves is being used and 
sold.  From direct mail one has some sense of who has bought a name from a mailing list, but not 
who sold the name.  Likewise with the online environment, it is not clear who is observing 
behavior when visiting a page.  A company could be tracking activity without even displaying 
ads, just by using a web bug. 
  
As discussed in the previous chapter, there are tools available for users which block tracking 
cookies and ads from most well-known ad networks.  (That said, many tools that claim to be 
“anti-spyware” are themselves spyware, which makes it more difficult for users to trust websites’ 
claims about privacy (Zittrain, 2006).)  One might wonder what would happen if a large share of 
Internet users were to become aware of these tools.  This would have dramatic consequences for 
the online ecosystem, as online advertising spending would decrease and force content providers 
to find other ways to make money.  Or, publishers might prohibit access to the content unless the 
user consented to tracking.   
 
Thus while users may appear to have some control over whether or not they are tracked, 
publishers could, if necessary, design their sites so that tracking is required in order to access 
content.   However, if users were sufficiently unhappy with this arrangement, they might find 
ways to share the content with each other, like people already do with copyrighted music and 
movies.  Alternatively, if users do consent to tracking, they must to some extent trust the service 
provider’s handling of your personal information.   Technology can not guarantee this trust; it is, 
by necessity, social trust.   Ideally, one would hope that privacy policies would become clearer 
about how data might be used or sold.  There are cases where users have protested when online 
services did something that they felt violated the users’ privacy – for example, when Facebook 
started sharing information about users’ activities on other websites.  
5.6.1 User choice or involvement in online tracking: some alternative scenarios 
There are ways that users could be given more power, choice or at least knowledge about how 
their behavior is tracked.  Several scenarios are imaginable. 
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One can imagine publishers allowing users to choose what kind of advertising they would like to 
receive, by selecting from a list of categories.  However, it seems unlikely that this would satisfy 
the desire of technologists to make use of data as much as possible to do advanced prediction.  
The categories offered would have to be relatively broad, general categories; it is doubtful that 
users would be interested in choosing from a long list of very specific categories.   On the other 
hand, just indicating an interest in “health” or “sports” is unlikely to be very useful for 
advertisers.  Even if users were willing to choose from a greater number of categories, they 
might be reluctant to repeat this complicated selection process for many different publishers.  
There might be a desire to create a kind of shared profile that could be used by many different 
publishers.  This would also make it easier for advertisers, because rather than having to deal 
with a variety of different taxonomies from different publishers, they would only have to deal 
with a small number.   
 
Such a system might disrupt the process by which publishers sell large amounts of inventory in 
bulk directly to advertisers.  A publisher could no longer guarantee showing one ad to all of its 
users, because they would each have different preferences, unless there was somehow a clear 
indication to the user that their preferences affect some ads but not others. 
 
As a step in this direction, there are behavioral targeting systems that allow users to see the 
categories of content in which the user is believed to be interested.  For example, Google’s Ads 
Preferences Manager40 displays the set of categories of sites on which Google has observed the 
user.  While this can be lauded as a step forward in terms of giving users more awareness of what 
is happening, it is limited.  It does not depict the full depth and detail of the data that Google has 
collected and finds of interest.  It may indicate simply that a user is interested in “Travel” but in 
reality, the Google system may know many more specifics about what kinds of flights she has 
examined.  Google may know that she searched for flights to Amsterdam last Thursday.  If the 
full detail of data was revealed, people might be more concerned. 
 
An alternative way to give the user power is to allow him or her to choose how his or her 
behavior will be tracked, in other words, allowing the user to choose from a set of behavioral 
tracking service providers.  This would put the service provider in a more direct relationship with 
the users, rather than having the publisher take the first responsibility for the tracking 
relationship.  Potentially the user could pay more or less depending on the amount of tracking 
that was done.  Users could then opt for tracking only on certain categories of sites.   
 
Another option is to use software running on users’ computers to decide which ads to show based 
on the user browsing history stored on the computer.  Ads would still be targeted, but there 
would be no need for a centralized database storing the browsing histories of all users.  Toubiana 
et al. (Toubiana, Narayanan, Boneh, Nissenbaum, & Barocas) propose one way this might be 
done with a browser plug-in that downloads a set of candidate advertisements and then chooses 
from that list based on the user’s browsing history. 
 
Finally, there could be a way for users to “vote” on particular advertisements, without having to 
click on them and be interrupted from their current activity.  This could be done with a set of 
checkboxes next to each ad that allow users to indicate which advertisements do and do not 
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 http://www.google.com/ads/preferences/  
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interest them.  This would be a public admission of what has until now been a not-so-obvious 
fact: that an online advertising campaign is also a real-time survey, a means of gathering data 
about people’s interests and desires.  It would provide another kind of data to be used for 
targeting, while at the same time giving the user a feeling that she can contribute to the targeting 
process, rather than being a passive subject of observation.  Of course, this would only work if 
the voting data was used instead of (and not in addition to) behavioral browsing data for ad 
targeting.  Publishers might need to provide some rewards to users for voting, in order to 
guarantee that a sufficient amount of data is collected.     
 
To make this system work, there would have to be enough advertisers or enough distinct 
advertisements in the system that users could actually be presented with different offers 
depending on their choices.  Otherwise, users would get frustrated that their choices are being 
ignored.  The risk to publishers (and potentially networks), of course, is that the advertisers that 
pay the most will be voted down by users. 
 
One might ask if the user would have any incentive to misreport or lie about his interests.  If the 
ads dealt with sensitive personal materials (such as health or finances) a user might be reluctant 
to share an opinion.  If the user really hates advertising, he might enjoy entering false or 
misleading information into the system – a kind of “click fraud”.  Related to this, a company 
could hire people to vote down the offers from its competitors, potentially making the 
competitors’ ads less likely to appear.  A voting system could be manipulated in different ways 
than current advertising systems, because current systems only allow two kinds of responses to 
an ad (clicking and not clicking), while a voting system has four (positive vote, negative vote, 
clicking, and no action).   
 
All of the options described in this section would require cooperation from publishers and 
potentially advertising networks.  Users could not implement these systems on their own.  The 
question is whether they could still provide enough revenue from the kind of targeting they 
provide.  It would also be desirable, with any of these systems, to allow third-parties to audit the 
collection of data to the extent possible (for example, by still using cookies and JavaScript so 
that activity could be observed).  In addition, many of these systems might be more effective 
with a strong form of user identity that persists across sites and does not easily disappear, like 
cookies currently do.  Alternatively, users could create accounts on the third-party tracking 
system and then provide that username to publishers.   
 
In short, there are a number of conceivable ways to achieve some kind of middle ground between 
the current form of behavioral targeting (which is surreptitious and not obvious to users) and a 
blanket ban on aggregation of personal data.  However, the value propositions and business 
models for these targeting systems still need to be elaborated. 
5.7 Conclusion 
The analysis here points to several ways in which the drive for behavioral data is helping 
aggregators to develop, be they publishers, agencies, networks, or (though it seems less likely) 
ISPs.  If they are aggressive enough, the agenices might gain a stronger position by working with 
publishers more directly and building their own networks.  But if agencies do not move in this 
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manner, it appears that networks and exchanges will be in the strongest position.  For publishers 
to gain ground, they would have to make a dramatic shift, such that they would no longer be 
“publishers” in the true sense of the word, but rather “information experiences”.  It is 
conceivable that users could gain more control over behavioral tracking, but this would require 
more willingness by networks and advertisers to engage with users’ privacy concerns. 
 
This thesis will close with several additional general thoughts about the evolution of online 
advertising. 
 
Advertising agencies are still adapting to the possibilities and challenges of the Internet.  
They are caught in varying degrees between the past and the future.  In a sense, they represent a 
kind of “inertia” from the pre-Internet era: the old model of buying mass media (TV, cable, print 
and newspaper) at large scale remains.  It will take some more time yet before new models 
stabilize. 
 
Behavioral targeting challenges big brands’ traditional strategy of broadcasting one 
message to millions of people, and may be more suitable for small-scale marketers.  More 
generally, the Internet may force changes in the entire concept of “branding”.  As discussed 
earlier, behavioral targeting is presently not a tool for brands interested in reaching a mass 
audience.  The total costs of behavioral targeting campaigns can be less than mass media buys 
(even though CPMs might be higher), making it easier for small marketers to use behavioral 
targeting.  Big brands may be hurt because they are forced to bid their CPMs up in competition 
with the niche advertisers who are willing to pay higher CPMs.  Behavioral targeting might then 
have a different base of political support to lobby against privacy regulations. 
 
Before the Internet, “branding” largely meant 30-second TV spots, print ads, and product 
packaging.  Advertisers could control the brand because there were limited ways for users 
(consumers) to communicate with each other and tell their own stories about products.  With the 
Internet, however, users have more control over products’ social meanings. 
 
Behavioral data collection will merge with other kinds of market research, and behavioral 
targeting may merge with social media marketing.  The technologies are still evolving and 
the payoffs from various technologies are unclear.  It is tempting to look at the future through 
a couple of different scenarios: one where behavioral targeting is wildly successful (for 
marketers) and another where it fails.  Rather the future is likely to be more complex, where 
behavioral targeting merges with social media marketing and other kinds of market research41.  
These are all a variety of projects attempting to classify and categorize people based on their 
online activity.  “Behavioral targeting” is currently focused on just the sequence of web pages 
that a user visits, but in the future, it might be combined with peoples’ contributions to social 
media sites, their social graph and offline activity, such as TV watching and in-store shopping.  
Agencies might be in the best position to do this kind of integrated research.  It is still not clear 
that behavioral targeting by itself will yield huge improvements in marketing ROI, but 
behavioral data might have value for market research. 
 
It does not seem likely that behavioral targeting itself would lead to a significant overall 
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 For one agency’s take on this, see Razorfish (2009). 
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increase in spending on online advertising.  There are other factors restraining the growth 
of online advertising.  As discussed earlier, unless a large portion of publisher inventory can be 
targeted at high rates, the overall revenue received by publishers will not increase significantly.  
Thus behavioral targeting is not itself a solution to publishers’ woes.  Furthermore, it makes 
publishers’ task more complex as their revenue becomes determined by user data collected by 
third parties completely outside the control of publishers.  If ad targeting is based primarily on 
user profiles, prestigious publishers’ content has less weight in the marketplace.  Why would 
advertisers pay extra to reach a user on the New York Times if they can reach him on other sites 
for much less?  (Of course, this assumes a buyers’ market, where there is an abundance of 
inventory and places to reach users, and a relative scarcity of advertisers willing to pay premium 
prices.)  It is hard enough for publishers to determine the demographics of their audiences online.  
It is harder still for them to know about their users’ interests, unless they become much more 
interactive and increase their “depth of identity”.   
 
If there is to be significant growth in online advertising spending, it will be the result of a 
number of changes, including advertisers and agencies gaining more experience with online 
advertising.  A new concept of “branding” may be part of this, as will the development of 
standard metrics for audience measurement (Nielsen, 2009b).  The web offers many different 
kinds of measurements, making it difficult for the ecosystem to settle on one particular model.  It 
is not that the current online metrics are necessarily worse than their counterparts in other media; 
Nielsen TV surveys had problems of their own, but people accepted them because they were 
“good enough” and because there were no other options.  On the Internet, however, any number 
of metrics have been proposed, and no clear winner has emerged.  Potentially, after enough 
experimentation, some combination of actors with sufficient weight will settle on a set of 
standardized (though imperfect) metrics.  Ad exchanges might be a driving force. 
 
People have different privacy expectations in different contexts; an explicit 
acknowledgment of this fact might help assuage some of the concerns.  The privacy 
expectations for web mail might be higher than for a public discussion board.  The privacy 
expectations for Facebook are currently being negotiated.  Users will become more aware about 
privacy issues and in turn come to demand more transparency from service providers about the 
level of privacy they provide.  Potentially some of the privacy concerns could be addressed by an 
explicit recognition that there are different kinds of online “privacy environments” where 
different kinds of privacy norms apply42.  A “privacy environment” could be defined as a 
collection of affiliated sites that share data with each other about user behavior and track users as 
they move between the member sites.  Data does not move from one privacy environment to 
another, and users would have different IDs in different environments so their activities could not 
be cross-referenced.  Each privacy environment would have a logo that is displayed in an 
obvious place on all of the member sites (perhaps near the ads); clicking on the logo would 
present a page with some explanation about how data is shared between the sites.  A further 
elaboration of this idea would be for the privacy environment to give the user some further 
choice or control over the kind of tracking, as discussed in the previous section. 
 
Branded vertical networks, i.e. ad networks operated by a brand-name publisher like Fox or 
MTV but also serving ads on a hand-picked collection of lesser-known sites, could be one kind 
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 Thanks to Dan Pereira at the MIT Convergence Culture Consortium for suggesting this idea. 
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of privacy environment, assuming that they do not share data with external parties.  On the other 
hand, ad exchanges might facilitate the exchange of user data and cross-referencing of identities 
between different actors and environments, and thus threaten the sharp delineation of such 
environments. 
 
Related to the previous point, different modes of data collection are more or less obvious to 
users; if data collection is to be accepted, perhaps it is better to make it more obvious, 
and/or give users some choice or control over the process.  “Recommendation engines” are 
good models of how the user benefits of behavioral targeting can be achieved in ways that are 
also more transparent to users.  Like a recommendation engine on a site such as Amazon.com, a 
behavioral targeting system suggests other products a user might be interested in based upon his 
past choices and potentially what he looked at in the past but did not buy.  Unlike Amazon’s 
recommendation engine (it is believed), the placement of offers in front of a person is also partly 
determined by how much advertisers are willing to pay.  A recommendation engine can also be 
based on the recommendations or actions of friends, for example, social network connections, or 
user votes.  But in all cases, it should be clear to users that the recommendations are based on 
past activity or behavior, which is not the case with current behavioral targeting systems. 
 
If Facebook ads become increasingly based on the contents of individuals’ social expression, 
users may become more aware of how their data can be used for marketing purposes, and the 
privacy tradeoffs associated with different online services.  Behavioral targeting can also be 
obvious, for example in the form of re-targeting, which reminds a user about a product they were 
recently viewing but did not purchase.  But it can also be more subtle, and therefore harder for 
the user to notice.  One might argue that the more obvious the profiling, the better, because it 
makes clear to users the bargain they are making with online services.  Subtle and complex 
profiling is less likely to be noticed by consumers and therefore more insidious.  Of course, 
marketers may be reluctant to make their profiling too obvious; this is the “cat and mouse” game 
that advertisers play.  
 
 As discussed in the previous section, users could be offered more choice or control of targeting, 
which again would require marketers to cede some control over how advertising is distributed – 
in short, making advertising more like other forms of content. 
 
A distributed open-source project could gather useful data for researchers and 
policymakers about the extent of aggregators’ observation of users, as well as about online 
advertising in general.  This might build from the work of Krishnamurthy and Wills (2009) 
discussed earlier, but access a greater variety of pages on different sites, and from a variety of 
locations and potentially with a variety of cookies so that it could measure the extent to which 
different ads are shown to different users.  The greater the number of people involved in the 
project, the more it could observe subtle forms of targeting.  If only a few people were involved 
in such a project, it would be statistically difficult to know the extent to which the ads seen by 
one person were personalized.  Such a project would be analogous to a number of other 
distributed data-collection projects, including Herdict43, which attempts to collect data about 
Internet censorship in a distributed manner.   
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 http://www.herdict.org/web/  
69 
 
This leverages the open and generative nature of the web, taking advantage of the web’s ability 
to “observe itself”.  The current mode of behavioral tracking, using browser interactions, 
Javascript and cookies, makes it in some sense “public”, at least to technically savvy users.  This 
differs from the buying and selling of mailing lists, which is harder to “reverse engineer”.  Of 
course, the proposed project could not observe how data from publishers and networks is shared 
behind the scenes, i.e. directly between servers, rather than through browser-based mechanisms.  
In addition, such a project would have privacy concerns of its own, as it would involve the 
aggregation of browsing data from a number of computers. 
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